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SUMMARY
This thesis comprises three essays on Industrial Organization. The rst chapter
contributes to the literature on e¢ ciency of a market share discounts use. The second
chapter is a joint research papers with Emmanuel Petrakis and Chrysovalantou Milliou,
where we study an equilibrium structure in multiproduct successive oligopolies. The third
chapter investigates rmsincentives for vertical separation and integration. Each chapter
can be considered independently of the rest.
The rst chapter investigates the pro- and anticompetitive e¤ects of market share discounts
(MSDs). While MSDs can be used for exploiting a dominant position and lead to a welfare
reduction, MSDs can also serve as an e¢ cient device for the creation of an investment
incentive. Particularly, if the nal demand for an upstream manufacturers good depends
on retailers promotional e¤ort, the manufacturer can e¤ectively use MSDs to induce the
optimal level of the retailers e¤ort. Moreover, it is possible that MSDs have a positive
impact both on the consumerssurplus and total industry prots. Thus, the main result of
the chapter is that MSDs should not be treated anticompetitive apriori, but rather they
should be judged on a case-by-case basis.
In the second chapter, we develop a successive oligopoly model in which multi-product
upstream manufacturers sell their products to consumers through downstream retailers. The
product variety o¤ered by each manufacturer and the entry in the upstream market are both
endogenous. We show that the equilibrium conguration of the upstream market depends
crucially on the economies of scope in the process of new product creation. When the
economies of scope are weak the number of manufacturers increases and each manufacturer
produces a single product. Manufacturers produce multiple products only if the economies
of scope are su¢ ciently strong. Furthermore, we examine how a number of other market
characteristics, such as the market size, the product substitutability and the number of
retailers a¤ect product variety, entry, rmsprots and welfare.
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The third chapter explores rms incentives for strategic vertical separation in duopoly
settings. Each rm chooses either to be a retailer of its own good (vertical integration) or
to sell its good through an independent exclusive retailer (vertical separation). In the latter
case, a two-part tari¤ contract is applied. Retailers compete in quantities, goods are perfect
substitutes and rmscost functions are quadratic. It is shown that the equilibrium crucially
depends on the degree of the (dis)economies of scale and the asymmetry in rmscosts.
Two asymmetric equilibria arise, in which one rm separates while the other integrates,
when both rmscost functions exhibit su¢ ciently high diseconomies of scale, or extreme
asymmetry of their costs. When the cost asymmetry is moderate, a unique equilibrium
exists in which the rm with the lower degree of diseconomies of scale separates, while
its rival integrates. When instead the diseconomies of scale are low for both rms, in the
unique equilibrium both rms separate. Robustness analysis demonstrates that the results
hold also under mild assumptions of a demand and cost functions.
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La tesis se compone de tres ensayos en el marco de Organizacion Industrial. El primer
capítulo, contribuye a la literatura existente sobre descuendo por cuota de mercado. El
segundo capítulo representa un trabajo hecho junto con Emmanuel Petrakis y Chrysovalan-
tou Milliou, donde estudiamos el equilibrio para el mercado con oligopolios multiproductos
sucesivos. El tercer capítulo investiga los incentivos de las empresas para los casos de la
separación vertical y de la integración. Cada capítulo puede ser considerado independien-
temente del resto.
El primer capítulo estudia los efectos favorables y contracompetitivos de descuendo por
cuota de mercado (market share discounts, MSD). Aunque MSD se puede utilizar para la
explotación de una posición dominante y resulta en una disminución del bienestar, MSD
también puede servir como un instrumento ecaz para crear los incentivos a la inversión.
En particular, si la demanda nal de un fabricante upstream depende del esfuerzo de pro-
moción del minorista, el fabricante puede utilizar MSD con ecacia para inducir el nivel
óptimo de esfuerzo del minorista. A parte, es posible que MSD tenga un impacto positivo
tanto sobre el excedente del consumidor y los benecios de la industria. Por lo tanto, el
resultado principal del capitulo es que MSD no debe ser tratado únicamente contracompet-
itivo a priori, sino que debe ser juzgado caso por caso.
En el segundo capítulo, se desarrolla un modelo de oligopolio sucesivo en el que los fab-
ricantes multiproductos upstream venden sus productos a los consumidores a través de
minoristas downstream. La variedad de productos que ofrece cada fabricante y la entrada
en el mercado upstream son endogenas. Se demuestra que el equilibrio del mercado up-
stream depende fundamentalmente del marco de las economías en el proceso de la creación
de nuevos productos. Cuando las economías son débiles aumenta el número de fabricantes
y cada fabricante produce un solo producto. Los fabricantes producen varios productos sólo
si las economías son lo sucientemente fuertes. Además, se examina cómo una serie de otras
caracteristicas del mercado, tales como el tamaño del mercado, la posibilidad de sustitu-
ción del producto y el número de minoristas, afectan variedad de productos, la entrada, los
benecios de las empresas y el bienestar.
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El tercer capítulo analiza los incentivos de las empresas para la separación vertical estratég-
ica en el marco de duopolio. Cada empresa elige uno de los dos casos: ser un minorista
de su propio bien (integración vertical) o vender su bien a través de un distribuidor exclu-
sivo independiente (separación vertical). En este último caso se aplica la tarifa por partes.
Los minoristas compiten en cantidades, los bienes son sustitutos perfectos y funciones de
costes de las empresas son cuadráticas. Se muestra que el equilibrio depende del grado de
las (des)economias de escala y la asimetria de los costes de las empresas. Dos equilibrios
asimétricos surgen, en los que una empresa se separa mientras que la otra se integra, cuando
las funciones de coste de ambas rmas exhiben las des economias de escala lo suciente-
mente alta, o asimetría extrema de sus costes. Cuando la asimetría de costes es moderada,
existe un único equilibrio en el que la empresa con el menor grado de las des economías de
escala separa, mientras que su rival se integra. Sin embargo cuando las des economías de
escala son bajas para las ambas empresas, en el único equilibrio ambas empresas separan.
Análisis de robustez demuestra que estos resultados se mantienen bajo supuestos leves de
la demanda y las funciones de coste.
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CHAPTER I
MARKET SHARE DISCOUNTS AND INVESTMENT
INCENTIVES
1.1 Introduction
Vertical restraints, such as loyalty rebates, resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing and
exclusive territories are often used in dealing between manufacturers and retailers. In some
cases, vertical restraints serve an anti-competitive purpose by excluding competitors or
creating entry barriers. In other cases, vertical restraints are used to increase e¢ ciency
by eliminating double price marginalization, reaching an optimal level of production or
by creating the "right" incentive for vertically related rms. In all these cases, vertical
restraints are of considerable interest to antitrust practitioners.
In this paper, I analyze a special type of vertical restraint, i.e. market share discounts
(MSDs) (also known as loyalty rebates). MSDs are discounts that a manufacturer o¤ers to
its distributors, or retailers, if their sales of the manufacturers brand comprise a su¢ ciently
high percentage of their total sales for a given class of goods. Thus, MSDs are a special
type of discount which is based on the quantity of goods that the retailer buys from both
the manufacturer and its competitors.
The increasing number of antitrust cases related to such restraints conrms that manu-
facturers are using such arrangements increasingly in recent years1. The case of the Concord
Boat Corporation versus the Brunswick Corporation is one of the well-known examples of
the use of MSDs2. Brunswick manufactured and sold stern drive engines for recreational
boats; it had a large share of the market (i.e., 75% in 1983). Beginning in the early 1980s,
Brunswick o¤ered market share discounts. Boat builder customers who agreed to purchase
1See "Roundtable on loyalty or delity discounts and rebates", DAFFE meeting, May, 2002, Tom et al.
(2000) and Kobayashi (2005) for a review.
2See Concord BoatCorp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000)
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a certain percentage of their engine requirements from Brunswick for a period of time (often
a year, sometimes longer) received a discount o¤ the list price for all engines purchased3.
Some of the boat builders sued Brunswick, alleging among other claims, that these dis-
count programs excluded competing stern drive engine manufacturers from the market and
amounted to monopolization. A court ruled that Brunswicks pricing amounted to de facto
exclusive dealing, and foreclosed rival suppliers of marine engines from the market. On
appeal, that ruling was reversed on grounds that market conditions were not conducive to
foreclosure.
An additional example is the case of Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. versus British Air-
ways4. British Airways (BA) used incentive programs that provided travel agencies with
commissions, and corporate customers with discounts, for meeting specied thresholds for
sales of BA tickets (sometimes expressed in terms of market share). Virgin Atlantic claimed
that the result was below cost pricing on certain transatlantic routes where Virgin and BA
competed, with BAs attendant losses being subsidized by monopoly pricing on other BA
routes. Virgin alleged that the below cost pricing slowed its expansion on the competitive
routes. Both a district court and a court of appeals concluded that Virgin had failed to
demonstrate that pricing was below cost.
In this paper, I consider a vertically related two-level industry. At the upstream level, a
manufacturer and a competitive fringe produce imperfect substitutes. At the downstream
level, there is only one retailer which trades both goods to nal consumers5. The manufac-
turer may o¤er to the retailer either a wholesale price contract or a market share discount
contract. Further, the retailer can make a costly e¤ort investment which results in an in-
crease in the demand of the manufacturers good. By assumption this e¤ort has no e¤ect
on the demand for the competitive sectors rms good. The e¤ort level is noncontractible;
hence, neither the wholesale price nor MSDs may be contingent on the retailers e¤ort
level. This allows us to analyze the role of MSDs as a tool for the creation of incentives,
3Particularly, an agreement to buy 70% of engine requirements from Brunswick might result in a 3%
discount, agreement for 65% in a 2% discount, and an agreement for 60% in a 1% discount.
4Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001).
5The similar setup is adopted in papers of Mills (2009) and Chioveanu and Akgun (2006).
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as well as to consider the welfare e¤ects of MSDs. To highlight this role I begin with a
consideration of a benchmark case in which the retailers e¤ort has no impact on demand.
Then I analyze the case in which the retailers e¤ort results in an increase in the demand
of the manufacturers good.
In the benchmark case, I nd that if MSDs are applied, both the quantity of the
manufacturers sales and the manufacturers prot increase; the quantity of the good sold
by the competitive sectors rm decreases. The total industry prot decreases as does
consumerssurplus. Thus, only the manufacturer gains from the use of MSDs. This allows
us to conclude that MSDs have an anticompetitive character in this setting. For the case
when the retailers e¤ort is productive I obtain the following results. First, if the wholesale
price contract is applied, the manufacturer may not be able to motivate the retailer to
undertake the desired level of e¤ort. In this case, the market outcome is the same as in the
benchmark case with wholesale price contracts. If MSDs are applied, then the manufacturer
can design the menu of prices in such a way that the retailer undertakes the desired level of
e¤ort, i.e. e¢ cient from the social point of view. Moreover, in this case both the industry
prot and consumer surplus are higher with MSDs then only with wholesale price contract.
Another important result is that while the use of MSDs increases the manufacturers market
share, it does not completely drive competing rms out of the market. Thus a use of the
MSD contract is socially more preferable than a use of wholesale price contract.
Combining the above results, one can see that the judgments on whether MSDs have
an anti- or procompetitive e¤ect depends crucially on the features of the market environ-
ment. While, in some cases, MSDs may serve for a redistribution of prot between the
manufacturer and the retailer and may lead to a decrease in social welfare, in other cases,
they may also serve as an e¢ cient instrument for the creation investment incentives and
may result in an increase in total social welfare. Thus, the treatment of MSDs should be
deduced on a case-by-case basis.
Recently some papers have examined di¤erent aspects of MSDs. For example, Marx and
Sha¤er (2004) and Greenlee and Reitman (2004) analyze the rent-shifting e¤ects of MSDs.
Marx and Sha¤er (2004) examine the use of MSDs, slotting allowances and predatory
3
pricing in a three-party sequential contracting environment. In their model two sellers
negotiate sequentially with one buyer. MSDs and slotting allowances are used to shift rents
between the contracting parties, with no short run consequences for social welfare. They
nd that this type of rent shifting equilibrium generally results in both sellers remaining in
the market. In the long run, the authors suggest that preventing the use of such devices
will result in the adoption of strategies that are more likely to result in one of the sellers
being excluded. However, the model does not explicitly analyze the welfare e¤ect of such
long term e¤ects.
Greenlee and Reitman (2004) analyze the case of two competing rms selling their goods
to nal consumers by using loyalty rebates or wholesale price contracts. They nd that in
equilibrium only one rm applies market share discount. Moreover, as me show, that welfare
e¤ects of MSD use depends on the demand structure.
Majumdar and Sha¤er (2007) analyze a case where one manufacturer and a competitive
fringe supply goods to a retailer who has private information about the state of demand.
They examine the conditions under which market-share contracts are protable, and show
that the full-information outcome can be obtained. They show as well that MSDs contracts
are more protable than all-units discounts contract.
Chioveanu and Akgun (2006) compare a manufacturers incentives to apply MSDs,
all-unit discounts and incremental-unit discounts. They show that in a situation where
there is full information, all discounts are equivalent from both manufacturers and social
viewpoints. However, under uncertainty, the attitude toward risk of the retailer can play a
crucial role in the form of the loyalty discount applied by the manufacturer.
Greenlee et al. (2004) analyze the use of bundled market share discounts by a multi-
product monopolist. They show that it may exclude an equally e¢ cient competitor that
produces a single-product, and that the welfare e¤ects are ambiguous.
Ordover and Sha¤er (2007) show that when MSDs are implemented by a dominant rm,
who may have easier access to nancing compared to a rival, they can sometimes exclude
an equally-e¢ cient rival and lower overall welfare.
MSDs could also be used for e¢ ciency reasons. Mills (2009) examines the competitive
4
e¤ects of a vertically di¤erentiated product manufacturer implementing MSDs in its sales
to its distributors. His central idea is that MSDs are not mainly an exclusionary device,
but rather a device for inducing merchandising services that help consumers make well-
informed decisions. Mills (2009) assumes that each consumer has unit demand and the
retailers e¤ort increases a share of consumers who prefer the manufacturers good. Mills
shows that MSDs induce increased selling e¤ort and improve e¢ ciency comparing to the
use of the wholesale price contract. In some cases MSDs may lead to redistribution of
gross industry benet but in Millssetup they never reduce social welfare comparing to a
wholesale price use. This result is crucially depends on assumption that consumers have a
unit demand.
Like Mills (2009), I examine e¢ ciency of MSD. In contrast to Mills (2009), I consider
linear demand functions and demonstrate that the impact of MSDs on social welfare is in
general ambiguous and crucially depends on model specication. In my model, the retailer
may reach any required market threshold (by decreasing the quantity of other goods it
sells) without undertaking any e¤ort. In fact, this possibility is a base for arguments on
anticompetitive nature of MSDs and must be taken into account.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model. Section
1.3 considers the benchmark case. Section 1.4 analyses the case with a productive e¤ort.
Section 1.5 includes the welfare analysis and a numerical example and section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The Model
There is one retailer, R, which sells two substitutable goods to nal consumers. The rst
good is produced by a brand-name upstream manufacturer, M . The brand manufacturer
produces with a constant marginal cost, c  0. The second good is produced by a compet-
itive fringe. The marginal cost of production of the second good is zero.
The retailer can undertake a costly investment e¤ort which will increase the demand
for the manufacturers good. For example, consumers may not be perfectly informed about
the quality of the manufacturers good and the retailer can provide consumers with that
information by o¤ering promotion, better visibility etc. It is reasonable to assume that this
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e¤ort is made by the retailer and not the manufacturer. The level of the e¤ort is discrete,
e = f0; 1g and not contractible. The cost of e¤ort is E > 0.
A representative consumer has utility function of the form:
U(q1; q2) = A(e)q1 + q2   1
2
(q21 + 2bq1q2 + q
2
2); (1)
where q1; q2 are the quantities purchased by the consumer, b 2 (0; 1);is the degree of goods
di¤erentiation. I assume that the parameter A depends on the retailers e¤ort level with
A(1) = A1  A(0) = 1. I assume that 1  b  c > 0.
The utility function (1) generates the inverse demand for the manufacturers good,
p1 = A(e)   q1   bq2; which depends on the retailers e¤ort level, and the demand for the
competitive sectors rms good p2 = 1  q2   bq1. The latter does not depend on the e¤ort
level.
The manufacturer may use two types of contracts in dealing with the retailer, i.e. a
wholesale price contract, which species a constant per-unit price, !, and market-share
discounts. Denote s = q1=(q1+q2) then the the manufacturers contract species parameters
ftL; tH ; sg that form a menu of prices:
tMSD =
8><>: tL if s  stH if s < s tH > tL; (2)
where s denote the share of the manufacturers good as a proportion of the total sales of
the retailer, s is the market share threshold that the retailer must meet in order to buy
at the two prices tL, and tH : Meanwhile, tL (tH) state the manufacturers price when the
retailer does (does not) meet the market share requirement.
Let t denote either the single price ! or the menu of prices tMSD. All producers in
the fringe compete in prices. As a result the competitive sectors rms set prices equal to
marginal cost and obtain zero prot.
The retailers prot is:
R = (A(e)  q1   bq2   t)q1 + (1  q2   bq1)q2   eE:
The prot of the brand manufacturer is:
M = q1(t  c);
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where t is either the wholesale price or the menu of prices.
The timing in the model is the following. In the rst stage, the manufacturer and
competitive sectors rms simultaneously set their prices. The manufacturer sets the menu
of prices, tMSD (as in (2)) or the wholesale price !. In the second stage, the retailer chooses
its e¤ort level e = f0; 1g and the levels of quantities, q1 and q2.
In what follows, I rst look at the special case of the model where A1 = A0 = 1.6 The
condition A1 = A0 implies that the retailers e¤ort has no e¤ect on the consumer demand
and that the manufacturer has no reason to motivate the retailer to undertake the costly
e¤ort. Then, I examine the general case where A1 > A0 = 1:In this case consumer demand
depends on the retailers e¤ort level. Prot functions are subscribed by indexes MSD and
WP for case when MSDs and the wholesale price contract is applied respectively.
1.3 Benchmark case: No investment e¤ort
1.3.1 Wholesale price contract
First, I consider the retailers problem:
max
q1;q2
RWP (q1; q2;!) = (1  q1   bq2   !)q1 + (1  q2   bq1)q2:
The solution for the rst order conditions is: q1(!) = 1 b !2(1 b2) ; q2(!) =
1 b+b!
2(1 b2) .
The prot of the retailer as a function of the price ! can be rewritten as:
RWP (!) =
2  2b(1  !)  2! + !2
4(1  b2) :
Now the problem of the manufacturer can be written as:
max
!
RWP (!) = q1(!)(!   c) =
1  b  !
2(1  b2) (!   c)
and it has the solution: ! = 12(1  b+ c).
The market outcome is characterized by quantities produced by the manufacturer and
competitive sectors rms,
qWP1 =
1  b  c
4(1  b2) , q
WP
2 =
2  b  b2 + bc
4(1  b2)

;
6This case is considered as a benchmark for a comparison with the general case where A1 > A0 = 1:
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the price of the manufacturer,
! =
1
2
(1  b+ c);
the nal markets prices
fpWP1 =
1
4
(3  b+ c); pWP2 =
1
2
g
and the prots of the retailer and the manufacturer,
fRWP =
5  3b2   2b(1  c)  (2  c)c
16(1  b2) ; 
M
WP =
(1  b  c)2
8(1  b2) g:
1.3.2 MSD contract
The retailers prot maximization problem is:
max
q1;q2
RMSD(q1; q2; tMSD) = (1  q1   bq2   tMSD)q1 + (1  q2   bq1)q2
s.t. tMSD =
8><>: tL if s  stH if s < s
Note, if the retailer trades the good from the competitive sector then its prot is a solution
of the problem:
max
q2
R = (1  q2)q2:
This is equal to 1=4: It is the retailers "reservation prot" in the sense that the retailer is
guaranteed at least this prot level in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium values of ftL; tH ; sg are such that the retailer meets the market
share threshold, s  s.
Lemma 1 says that in equilibrium the manufacturers price tMSD is such that the retailer
always meets the market share threshold and buys at the price tL. The intuition is the
following. If the retailer does not meet the threshold, that is s < s, and it buys at the price
tH then the outcome does not change if the manufacturer sets prices ft0L; t0H ; s0g such that
t0L = tH , s
0 = s and t0H is the prohibitively high. Now, if the manufacturer increases the
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market share threshold slightly s0 > s then the retailer buys more for the same price and
the manufacturers prot is higher. Thus, s < s cannot stay in equilibrium. Hence, the
exact value of the manufacturers price tH does not play a role provided it is high enough.
Without loss of generality we can set tH = +1.
Corollary 2 In equilibrium it must be that s = s.
Note that if under equilibrium we obtain s 6= s; this would imply that the market
outcome is the same as in the case of wholesale price. In this case the manufacturer has
no possibility of increasing its prot by setting appropriate levels of s and tL, which is
contra-intuitive.
As a result of Corollary 2, the prot of the retailer can be written as:
max
q1;q2
RMSD(q1; q2; tL) = (1  q1   bq2   tL)q1 + (1  q2   bq1)q2
s.t.
q1
(q1 + q2)
= s:
The rst order condition gives the solution:
q1(tL; s) =
s(1  stL)
2(1  2s(1  b)(1  s)) :
Thus, the retailers prot as a function of tL and s is
RMSD(tL; s) =
(1  stL)2
4(1  2s(1  b)(1  s)) :
The manufacturers prot maximization problem now can be written as:
max
tL;s
MMSD = q1(tL; s)(tL   c);
s.t. q1(tL; s) =
8><>:
s(1 stL)
2(1 2s(1 b)(1 s)) if 
R
MSD(tL; s)  14
0 if RMSD(tL; s) <
1
4
:
Lemma 3 In equilibrium, the manufacturer extracts the entire retailers prot above the
reservation prot level.
The Lemma 3 says that in equilibrium, the equality RMSD(tL; s) =
1
4 holds. This gives
a correspondence between a price tL and market share threshold s which must hold in the
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equilibrium:
s(tL) =
2(1  b  tL)
2(1  b)  t2L
: (3)
Now, the prot maximization problem of the manufacturer becomes:
max
tL
MMSD(tL) = q1(s(tL); tL)(tL   c) =
1  b  tL
2(1  tL)(1  b) + t2L
(tL   c)
and it has the following unique solution:
tL =
(2  c)(1  b) D1
1  b  c ; (4)
where D1 = const =
p
(1  b2) (2(1  c)(1  b) + c2).
Plugging (4) into (3), we obtain the equilibrium values of s which together with tL
determine the rest of the equilibrium values. The market outcome is characterized by
quantities produced by the manufacturer and competitive sectors rms,
q1 =
1  b  c
2D1
, q2 =
1  b+ bc
2D1

;
the market share threshold,
s =
1  b  c
(1  b)(2  c) ;
the manufacturers price,
tL =
(2  c)(1  b) D1
1  b  c ;
the nal market prices
fp1 =
2D1   (1  b2)(1  c)
2D1
; p2 =
2D1 + b
2   1
2D1
g
and the prots of the retailer and the manufacturer,
fRMSD = 1=4; MMSD =
D1 + b
2   1
2(1  b2) g:
Lets note that b(1   c) < 1 implies s = 1 b c(1 b)(2 c) < 1. Hence we can formulate the
following Proposition.
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Proposition 4 Although the share of the manufacturer is higher in the case of MSDs than
in the case of wholesale price contract, the manufacturer never sets the market threshold
equals to 1.
Thus, the competitive sector is never foreclosed from the market completely and MSDs
do not result in an exclusive relation7. The intuition here is the following. According to (3),
the higher is the market share threshold s the lower the price tL must be in order to provide
the retailers with its reservation prot level. Thus, to implement s = 1; the manufacturer
has to set tL = 0; which does not maximize its prot.
1.3.3 MSDs vs. wholesale price contracts
In what follows, I compare the outcomes in the case of MSDs with those in the case of the
wholesale price contract.
Proposition 5 Relative to a wholesale price contract, MSDs leads to:
i) an increase in the manufacturers market share, s;
ii) the retailer buys at higher price, that is tL > !;
iii) an increase in the manufacturers output, q1;
iv) an increase in the manufacturers prot,
v) a decrease in the nal market price for the manufacturers good p1,
vi) an increase in the nal market price for the good p2,
vii) a decrease in the output of competitive sectors rms q2,
viii) a decrease in the retailers prot,
ix) a decrease in the consumer surplus.
According to Proposition 5 the manufacturer, which has some degree of market power,
uses MSDs to increase both its output and price in order to extract the entire prot of the
retailer above the reservation level. In the case of MSDs all agents, with the exception of
the manufacturer, lose. Hence MSDs can be treated as an anticompetitive tool.
7This result contributes to a discussion in the antitrust law literature (see for example Tom at el [2000])
on a relation between MSDs and exclusive dealing. See Bernheim and Whinston [1998], Katzs [1989] survey,
Marvel [1982], Mathewson and Winter [1987] on exclusive dealing.
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1.4 Investment E¤ort
1.4.1 Wholesale price contract
The prot maximization problem for the retailer is:
max
q1;q2;e
RWP = (A(e)  q1   bq2   !)q1 + (1  q2   bq1)q2   eE
where e 2 f0; 1g, A(0) = 1, A(1) = A1.
The rst order conditions with respect to q2 and q1 are:8><>: A(e)  2q1   2bq2   ! = 01  2bq1   2q2 = 0 :
The solution of the system is: q1(!; e) =
A(e) b !
2(1 b2) , q2(!; e) =
1 A(e)b+b!
2(1 b2) .
The retailers prot as a function of the e¤ort level e and the price ! is:
RWE(!; e) =
(A(e)  !)(A(e)  b  !)
4(1  b2) +
1 A(e)b+ b!
4(1  b2)   eE:
Retailers prot functions for di¤erent levels of the investment e¤ort, RWP (!; e)

e=0
and
RWP (!; e)

e=1
; are decreasing in ! functions with:
@RWP (!; e)
@!

e=1
=
 2A1 + 2b+ 2t
4(1  b2) <
 2 + 2b+ 2t
4(1  b2) =
@RWP (!; e)
@!

e=0
: (5)
Let b! denote the price such that the retailer is indi¤erent either to make the investment
e¤ort e = 1 or e = 0: The solution of RWP (b!; e)e=1 = RWP (b!; e)e=0 is
b! = 1
2
(A1 + 1  2b)  2E(1  b
2)
A1   1 ;
and the following conditions hold: if ! < b! then the retailers prot is higher if it makes
the e¤ort e = 1 and if ! > b! then the retailers prot is higher if its level of the e¤ort is
e = 0: Together with (5) it implies that the lower is the price !, the higher is the retailers
gain from the investment e¤ort, RWP (!; 1)  RWP (!; 0):
Now lets restrict the parameters of the model to rule out trivial cases.
Assumption 1.1. b! > 0:
Assumption 1.2. b! < 12(1  b+ c):
Assumption 1.3. A1 b b!
2(1 b2) (b!   c) < (1 b c)28(1 b2) :
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Assumption 1.4. b(A1 + c) < 1:
Assumption 1.1 implies that if the manufacturers price is low enough, ! 2 (0; b!]; then
the retailer makes the investment e¤ort. It may be rewritten in the form: (A1 1)(A1+1+2b)
4(1 b2) >
E and it rules out cases when the cost of e¤ort is "too high" (E ! +1) or the result of
the e¤ort investment is "too small" (A1  1). If Assumption 1.1 does not hold there is no
possibility of implementing the level of e¤ort e = 1:
Assumption 1.2 may be rewritten in the form (A1 1)(A1 b c)
4(1 b2) < E and it implies that
the e¤ort cost is not "too small" or that the e¤ect of the e¤ort investment is not "too high".
It is outside of our interest because in this case the retailer makes the e¤ort investment
regardless of the type of contract with the manufacturer.
Assumption 1.3 may be written in the form:
E >
(A1   1)[(1  b  c) +
p
(A1   1)(A1 + 1  2b  2c)
4(1  b2) :
This implies that neither the e¤ect of the e¤ort should be too high nor the cost of e¤ort too
low. In addition, it implies that the rate of substitution between goods should not be close
to 1. While Assumption 1.1 implies the possibility of implementation of the e¤ort level
e = 1; and Assumptions 1.2 implies that the e¤ort e = 1 is not implemented with necessity
under equilibrium, Assumption 1.3 allows us to concentrate on a case that reveals the role
of MSDs as a tool for the creation of investment incentives. Assumption 1.4 states that
the degree of goods substitution should not be close to 1.
The prot maximization problem of the manufacturer may be written in the form:
max
!
MWP = q1(!; e)(!   c) =
8><>:
A1 b !
2(1 b2) (!   c) if !  b!
1 b !
2(1 b2)(!   c) if ! > b! :
Lets note that in equilibrium the optimal manufacturers price does not exceed the level
(A1   b + c): Thus, the manufacturers prot function has the following properties: it is
kinked at point b! and it increases at both intervals ! 2 [0; b!] and ! 2 (b!; 12(A1   b + c)].
If ! 2 [0; b!] then the equilibrium e¤ort level is e = 1, while if ! 2 (b!; 12(A1   b + c)] then
e = 0:
13
The immediate result of Assumption 1.2 is that in order to implement the level of e¤ort
e = 1 the manufacturer sets the price ! = b! and gets the prot:
max
!2[0;b!]MWP = MWP

!=b! = A1   b  b!2(1  b2) (b!   c): (6)
Now, lets consider the manufacturers prot for the price ! 2 (b!; 12(A1  b+ c)]. While,
! > b!; the retailer does not undertake the investment e¤ort and the manufacturers prot,
MWP =
1 b !
2(1 b2)(!   c); reaches the maximum at the point ! = 12(1  b+ c) with,
max
!>b!MWP (!; e) =
(1  b  c)2
8(1  b2) : (7)
According to Assumption 1.3 the manufacturers prot is higher if it sets the price ! =
1
2(1   b + c) and a investment level of zero is implemented in equilibrium. Thus, given
Assumptions 1.1-1.3, the wholesale price contract which maximizes manufacturers prot
implies zero level of the retailers e¤ort. This immediately implies that the equilibrium
outcome coincides with the benchmark case with wholesale price contract.
1.4.2 MSD contract
The prot maximization problem of the retailer is:
max
q1;q2;e
RMSD = (A(e)  q1   bq2   tMSD)q1 + (1  q2   bq1)q2   eE: (8)
Lemma 6 In equilibrium, the condition s = s holds and the manufacturers price tH is
prohibitively high.
Hence, in equilibrium the retailer chooses q1, q2 such that q1=(q1 + q2) = s and buys at
the price tL. Plugging q2 = q1 1 ss into (8) and solving the rst order conditions we get the
optimal level of q1:
q1(s; tL; e) =
s(1 + s(A(e)  1  tL))
2(1  2s(1  b)(1  s)) :
Given ftL; sg the retailer makes the e¤ort if and only if8><>: 
R
MSD(e; tL; s)

e=1
 RMSD(e; tL; s)

e=0
RMSD(e; tL; s)

e=1
 14
; (9)
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where the retailers prot is:
RMSD(e; tL; s) =
(1  s+ s(A(e)  tL)2
4(1  2s(1  b)(1  s))   eE:
The rst inequality in (9) is an incentive constraint and it implies that for the retailer
it is protable to make the e¤ort e = 1. The second inequality in (9) is a participation
constraint and it implies that the prot of the retailer is greater or equal to its reservation
prot.
If the values of ftL; sg are such that8><>: 
R
MSD(e; tL; s)

e=1
 RMSD(e; tL; s)

e=0
RMSD(e; tL; s)

e=0
 14
; (10)
then the retailer chooses the e¤ort e = 0.
Now the manufacturers prot maximization problem is:
max
tL;s
MMSD = q1(tL; s)(tL   c), (11)
s.t. q1(tL; s) =
8>>>><>>>>:
s(1+s(A(e) 1 tL))
2(1 2s(1 b)(1 s)) if the condition (9) holds
s(1 s tL)
2(1 2s(1 b)(1 s)) if the condition (10) holds
0 otherwise
In what follows I consider MSD contract parameters that implement the retailers e¤ort
e = 1 and e = 0: Then I compare prots under these two levels of e¤ort to determine which
one provides manufacturer with higher prot. Lets rst consider the manufacturers prot
in the case where the price tMSD is such that condition (9) holds which implies that the
retailer makes the e¤ort e = 1.
Lemma 7 In equilibrium, the manufacturer extracts the entire retailers prot above the
reservation level.
The condition RMSD(e; tL; s)

e=1
 14 binds and this determines the equilibrium corre-
spondence on tL and s of the form:
tL(s) = A1   1 + 1 
p
1 + 4E
p
1  2s(1  b)(1  s)
s
(12)
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Plugging (12) into the manufacturers prot function (11) and solving the rst order con-
ditions we get the optimal value of s and tL:
s =
A1   b  c
(1  b)(1 +A1   c) ;
tL = A1   1 +
(1  b)(A1 + 1  c) D2
A1   b  c
where D2 = const =
p
(1  b2)(1 + (A1   c)(A1   c  2b)
p
(1 + 4E):
The prot of the manufacturer is
RMSD(t

L; s
; e)

e=1
=
(1 + 4E)(1 + (A  c)(A  c  2b) D2)
2D2
:
By setting
ftL = A1   1 +
(1  b)(A1 + 1  c) D2
A1   b  c ; t

H =1; s =
A1   b  c
(1  b)(1 +A1   c)g
the manufacturer motivates the retailer to make the e¤ort investment e = 1. Then equilib-
rium prots, prices, and outputs are the following.
fMMSD

e=1
=
(1 + 4E)(1 + (A  c)(A  c  2b) D2)
2D2
; RME

e=1
= 1=4g;
fq1 = (A1   b  c)(1 + 4E)
2D2
; q2 =
(1 Ab+ bc)(1 + 4E)
2D2
g;
fp1 = A1   (4E + 1)(A1   c)(1  b
2)
2D2
; p2 = 1  (4E + 1)(1  b
2)
2D2
g:
Now, lets consider the prot of the manufacturer in the case when it motivates the retailer
to choose a zero-level e¤ort. Given the price tL and the threshold s the retailers prot is
RMSD(e; tL; s)

e=0
= (1 stL)
2
4(1 2s(1 b)(1 s)) . The manufacturers maximization problem is:
max
tL;s
MMSD =
s(1  stL)
2(1  2s(1  b)(1  s))(tL   c);
s.t. (10) holds
The participation constraint RMSD(e; tL; s)

e=0
= 14 gives the correspondence tL(s) that
guarantees the reservation level of the prot to the retailer:
tL(s) =
1 p1  2s(1  b)(1  s)
s
: (13)
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Plugging (13) into (11) and solving the rst order conditions we get the optimal value of
s = 1 b c(1 b)(2 c) :
The optimal value of tL is:
tL =
(1  b)(2  c) D3
1  b  c ,
where D3 = const =
p
(1  b2)(1 + (1  c)(1  c  2b).
The prot of the manufacturer in this case is
MMSD(tL; s; e)

e=0
=
1 + (1  c)(1  c  2b) D3
2D3
:
Thus, if
MMSD(t

L(e); s
(e); e)

e=1
 MMSD(tL(e); s(e); e)

e=0
(14)
the manufacturer sets the price tL = A1   1 + (1 b)(A1+1 c) D2A1 b c ; market share threshold
s = A1 b c(1 b)(1+A1 c) and the equilibrium retailers level of the e¤ort is e = 1, otherwise the
manufacturer sets the price tL =
(1 b)(2 c D3)
1 b c ; the market share threshold s
 = 1 b c(1 b)(2 c)
and the equilibrium level for the retailers e¤ort is e = 0. For the purpose of the paper I
am interested in the former case.
Let 
 denote the set of parameters (A1, b, c, E) for which conditions (14), Assumptions
1.1-1.3 and the incentives compatibility constraint hold. The following technical lemma
states that the set 
 is the non-degenerated set.
Lemma 8 There is a compact set of the parameters of the model (A1; b; c; E) 2 
 where
inequalities (14), (9) and Assumptions 1.1, 1.2 and 1,3 are compatible.
Proof. The numerical example in part 1.5.1 proves that it contains at least one point.
Moreover because all functions used in (14) and Assumptions 1.1-1.3 are continuous the
required conditions hold in the neighborhood of the provided point.
The set 
 is characterized by the following properties. For given levels of the marginal
cost c and the degree of substitution b the set species the cost of e¤ort as a function of the
e¢ ciency of the e¤ort A1 : 0 < E(A1; b; c) < E  E(A1; b; c); where bounds E;E increase
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in A1:For a given level of A1 the higher level of b corresponds to a smaller interval [E;E]:
For instance:
if c = 0; A1 = 1:5; b = 0:5 then 
 = fE : E 2 [0:166; 0:253]g;
if c = 0; A1 = 1:5; b = 0:6 then 
 = fE : E 2 [0:175; 0:255]g and
if c = 0; A1 = 1:4; b = 0:5 then 
 = fE : E 2 [0:12; 0:1892]g:
Thus, MSDs allow the manufacturer to design the menu of prices such that the retailer
makes the level of the e¤ort e = 1:While, if only the wholesale price contract is applied,
the manufacturer implements the level of the e¤ort e = 0. Hence, we can conclude that
MSDs can be used by the manufacturer as an e¢ cient device for the creation of investment
incentives. Certainly, the manufacturer gains from the use of MSDs. In order to analyze
MSDs impacts from the social point of view I conduct a welfare analysis.
1.5 Welfare analysis
The consumer surplus is given by:
U(q1; q2) = A(e)q1 + q2   1
2
(q21 + 2bq1q2 + q
2
2)  q1p1   q2p2:
Proposition 9 For the set of parameters 
 the following statements hold:
1. When MSDs are applied, the manufacturer designs the menu of prices such that
the retailers level of the e¤ort is e = 1 When the wholesale price is applied the level of
e¤ort e = 0 is implemented under equilibrium.
2. The total industry prot is higher when MSDs are applied.
3. The total output is higher when MSDs are applied.
4. Both the consumerssurplus and the total welfare are higher when MSDs are applied.
Proof. The proposition immediately follows the numerical example in part 1.5.1 and
Lemma 8
The intuition for the result is the following. The retailer is motivated to make the
costly e¤ort only if the quantity of the manufacturers good that it resells is high enough.
That means that the manufacturers wholesale price should be small enough to achieve this.
Thus, the manufacturer faces a trade-o¤: either to set a lower wholesale price to shift the
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demand upward or to set a higher price and to remain on the same demand curve. The gain
by the manufacturer from an increase in the demand can be smaller than its losses from the
price reduction. Thus, the wholesale price contract may not be enough to implement the
desired level of e¤ort from the retailer. If MSDs are applied then the manufacturer may
use the market threshold to enforce the retailer to buy more of the manufacturers good,
up to the level where the costly e¤ort becomes protable for the retailer. The investment
e¤ort shifts the demand for the manufacturers good and increases both the manufacturers
prot and the consumers surplus.
1.5.1 A numerical example
Lets consider a numerical example with the following values for the parameters: A1 =
1:5; b = 0:7; c = 0:14; E = 0:2.
First I consider the case of the wholesale price !. Given these parameters for the model
the retailer is indi¤erent to making the e¤ort investment or not, if and only if
RWP (!; e)

e=0
= RWP (!; e)

e=1
;
that is
(1  !)(1  b  !)
4(1  b2) +
1  b+ b!
4(1  b2) =
(A1   !)(A1   b  !)
4(1  b2) +
1 A1b+ b!
4(1  b2)   E;
with the solution
b! = (A1   1)[A1 + 1  2b)]  4E(1  b2)
2(A1   1) = 0:142:
The manufacturers prot in this case is:
MWP (b!) = q1(b!)(b!   c) = A1   b  b!2(1  b2) (b!   c) = 0:0009:
For any price above the b! = 0:142 the retailer chooses a level of e¤ort of zero.
The wholesale price ! that maximizes the manufacturers prot is ! = 12(1 b+c) = 0:22
and the prot is
MWP =
1  b  !
2(1  b2) (!   c) = 0:61  0:078 = 0:006:
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Thus, the investment e¤ort e = 0 is implemented.
The equilibrium prices and quantities are (pWP1 ; p
WP
2 ) = (0:61; 0:5) and (q
WP
1 ; q
WP
2 ) =
(0:0784; 0; 445) respectively; the prot of the retailer is RWP = 0:2531; the consumer surplus
is CSWP = 0:1266. Thus, the total surplus is TSWP = 0:3857.
If MSDs applied then the manufacturer sets the price tL = 0:161 and the market share
threshold s = 0:9322 in order to implement the e¤ort investment level e = 1:The retailer
may choose either scenario indi¤erently. The rst being to make the e¤ort (e = 1) and
to set the optimal prices (pMSD1 ; p
MSD
2 ) = (0:83; 0:507). The quantities in this case are
(qMSD1 ; q
MSD
2 ) = (0:6375; 0; 046). The second scenario is not to trade the manufacturers
good at all and to set p2 = 1=2 and q2 = 1=2. The retailers prot in both cases is
RMSD = 1=4. It is assumed that in this case the retailer makes the investment e¤ort . Then
the manufacturers prot is MWSD = 0:0134; the consumer surplus is CS
MSD = 0:225.
Thus, the total surplus is TSMSD = 0:488. If the retailer chooses the e¤ort level e = 0
its prot is 0:1878 < 0:25. Thus, given ftL = 0:161,s = 0:9322g the equilibrium level of
the e¤ort is e = 1: To implement the e¤ort level e = 0 the manufacturer may set the price
tL = 0:221 and s = 0:287. The manufacturers prot in this case is 0:0123 < 0:0134: Thus,
if MSDs are applied then the equilibrium e¤ort level is e = 1:
The results conrmed in the example are the following: relative to the wholesale price
contracts, MSDs result in:
1) an increase in the manufacturers output, q1; and a decrease in the competitive sectors
rms output q2;
2) an increase in the manufacturers prot and a decrease in the retailers prot,
3) the retailer buys at the lower price, that is tL < !;
4) an increase in both the nal market prices p1 and p2,
5) an increase in the total industrys prot, an increase in the consumer surplus and, as
a result, an increase in the total welfare.
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1.6 Conclusion
The paper investigates the e¤ects of MSDs on market competition and welfare. First, we
consider the case without the possibility of the productive e¤ort investment. It is shown
that the manufacturer, who has some degree of market power, can use MSDs to extract
an additional prot through an increase in its market share and a decrease in the market
share of its competitors. Interpreted in this way, MSDs can be treated as anticompetitive
as they lead to a decrease in both the total industry prot and the consumer surplus.
However, if we consider the case where retailer can make e¤ort investment that increases
the demand for the manufacturers good, we nd that the MSDs can be used to motivate
the retailer to make an e¢ cient level of investment e¤ort. This happens because the MSDs
use guarantees that the quantity of the manufacturers good sold by the retailer is high
enough and this provides the incentives for the retailer to make the e¤ort investment. It is
shown that this outcome can not always be reached through the use of a wholesale price
contract. The main result is that MSDs can lead to an increase in both the total industry
prot and the social surplus. Hence the total welfare in the case of MSDs may be higher
relative to the case of the wholesale price.
A possible extension of the model is to consider the case of many heterogeneous retailers.
Probably, in this case the optimal menu of prices may include as many non-degenerated
price as well as market thresholds, as many retailers are at the downstream level in order
to provide incentives compatibility constraints for each retailer.
Another possible extension of the model is the comparison of the result of MSDs with the
results of other non-linear price schemes. There is particular interest in comparison of MSDs
and quantity discounts. Quantity discounts usually are not considered as anticompetitive
discounts and their use is not restricted by law. If it is shown that MSDs are more preferable
from the social point of view, than quantity discounts, it will provide more reasons to treat
MSDs as an e¢ ciency increasing, procompetitive tool. One possibility of getting this result
may be the consideration of a case of stochastic demand when the use of quantity discounts
can involve di¢ culties related to the absolute value of a discount threshold. MSDs may
not su¤er from this drawback in the case where both demands, for the manufacturers good
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and for the competitive sectors rms good, have the same shock. I leave these extensions
for future investigation.
1.7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. I proof the statement by contradiction. Suppose, in the equilibrium
the manufacturer sets fteL; teH ; seg and the retailer does not meet the market share threshold.
That is, s = q
e
1
qe1+q
e
2
< se, where fqe1; qe2g and s are equilibrium quantities and the equilibrium
market share of the manufacturer respectively.
Because in the equilibrium the market threshold restriction is not met, the level of
the market threshold se has no e¤ect on market outcome. In this case the equilibrium
price teH coincides with one in the case of wholesale price t
e
H =
1
2(1   b + c). As a result,
the equilibrium retailers prot equals one in the case of the wholesale price, RMSD =
5 3b2 2b(1 c) (2 c)c
16(1 b2) .
Lets note that the retailers prot is higher than its reservation prot. It is because
5 3b2 2b(1 c) (2 c)c
16(1 b2) >
1
4 , 5 3b2 2b(1 c) (2 c)c > 4(1 b2), (b+c)2 2(b+c)+1 > 0
, (1  b  c)2 > 0, were the last inequality is obviously true.
Lets construct new menu of prices t0 = ft0L; t0H ; s0g in the form:8>>>><>>>>:
t0L = t
e
H
t0H = +1
s0 = se + 
,
where  > 0.
Now lets show that the new price t0 gives the higher prot to the manufacturer.
Because t0H = +1, the retailer has either to meet the market share threshold or to trade
the competitive sectors rms good only. In the latter case its prot equals to the reservation
prot. In the former case, the retailer faces the same manufacturers price t0L = t
e
H but it
has to adjust quantities qe1, q
e
2 to meet the market share threshold. The optimal adjustment
implies a decrease in the quantity q2 and an increase in the manufacturers quantity q1.
Because of continuity of the retailers prot function in q1and q2, for  small enough we
have that the new retailers prot is still higher than the reservation prot. Thus, if the new
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price t0 is o¤ered then the retailer chooses new quantity q01 > qe1. Given the manufacturers
price remains the same, t0L = t
e
H ; the prot of the manufacturer is higher. Thus, fteL; teH ; seg
were not the equilibrium values which contradicts to the assumption.
Proof of Corollary 2. I proof the statement by contradiction. Lets ftL; tH ; sg and
s be the equilibrium manufacturers menu of prices and the equilibrium manufacturers
market share respectively. By Lemma 1 s  s and the retailer buys at the price tL.
Suppose s > s. Note that small changes in tL result in small changes in the equilibrium
quantities of q1, q2 and the condition s > s still holds.
If tL is higher (lower) than the equilibrium manufacturers wholesale price (which is
1
2(1 b+c)) then a small decrease (increase) in tL leads to an increase in the manufacturers
prot MMSD with s > s still holding. Thus, in equilibrium tL =
1
2(1 b+c) and the condition
RMSD >
1
4 holds. Now, if the manufacturer sets s
0 = s +  then the retailer has either to
trade the good 2 only or to adjust quantities q1, q2 to meet new threshold requirement. In
the former case the retailer obtains its reservation prot only while in the latter case its
prot decreases only slightly and it still remains higher than the reservation prot. Thus,
the retailer chooses to by more the manufacturers good at the same price. The prot
of the manufacturer is higher that contradict to the assumption that ftL; tH ; sg was the
equilibrium menu of prices.
Proof of Lemma 3. By Lemma 1 and Corollary 2 we have s = se and hence MMSD =
q1(t
e
L; s
e)(teL   c) = s
e(1 seteL)
2(1 2se(1 b)(1 se))(t
e
L   c).
Lets show that @
M
MSD
@tL
= s
2(c 2tL)+s
2(1 2s(1 b)(1 s))  0.
First, because 2s(1  b)(1  s)  max
s
2s(1  s)(1  b) = 1 b2 < 1; we have that
2(1  2s(1  b)(1  s)) > 0:
Hence, the denominator is positive. Second, the nominator is positive because
s2(c  2tL) + s > min
s
s2(c  2tL) + s = [s2(c  2tL) + s]
s= 12(2tL c) = 0
for any tL  c:
Thus, for any given level of se, MMSD is a non-decreasing in t
e
L function. Therefore,
the manufacturer sets teL to be as high as possible until 
R
MSD  14 . As the retailers prot
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RMSD deceases in t
e
L for any 0 < tL < 1, the manufacturer sets price such that 
R
MSD =
1
4 .
Proof of Proposition 5. i) The equilibrium manufacturers market share is s =
1 b c
(1 b)(2 c) in the case of MSDs and s
WP = q1q1+q2 =
1 b c
(1 b)(3 c+b) in the case of the WP
contract. As (3  c+ b) > 2 > (2  c), we have that s > sWP :
ii) Now, I show that tL =
(2 c)(1 b) D1
1 b c >
1
2(1 b+c) = !, whereD1 =
p
(1  b2)(2(1  c)(1  b) + c2).
(2 c)(1 b) D1
1 b c >
1
2(1  b+ c), 2(2  c)(1  b)  (1  b)2 + c2 > 2D1 ,
(1  b2) + (2(1  b)(1  c) + c2) > 2D1 ,
p
(1  b2)2 +p(2(1  c)(1  b) + c2)2 > 2D1 ,
(
p
(1  b2) p(2(1  c)(1  b) + c2))2 > 0:
Moreover, 1   b2 = 2(1   c)(1   b) + c2 , 1   b   c = 0; which contradicts to the
assumption. Thus, tL > !:
iii) qMSD1 =
1 b c
2D1
> 1 b c
4(1 b2) = q
WP
1 , D1 < 2(1 b2), 2(1 c)(1 b)+c2 < 4(1 b2):
By assumptions, c < 1  b)
2(1  c)(1  b) + c2 < 2(1  c)(1  b) + (1  b)2 =
= (1  b)[2(1  c) + (1  b)] = (1  b)[3  2c  b] <
< 3(1  b) < 4(1  b2):
iv) qMSD1 > q
WP
1 and t

L > ! give that 
M
MSD > 
M
WP :
v) Competitive sectors rms outputs in cases of WP and MSDs contracts are qWP2 =
2 b b2+bc
4(1 b2) and q
MSD
2 =
1 b+bc
2D1
; respectively.
First, lets note that D1 > 1  b2 because ofp
(1  b2)[2(1  c)(1  b) + c2]  min
c
p
(1  b2)[2(1  c)(1  b) + c2] =
=
p
(1  b2)[2(1  c)(1  b) + c2] jc=1 b = (1  b2)
Thus, qMSD2 =
1 b+bc
2D1
< 1 b+bc
2(1 b2) =
2 2b+2bc
4(1 b2) : Lets note that
2  2b+ 2bc < 2  b  b2 + bc
, b(b+ c  1) < 0;
which holds by assumptions and therefore qMSD2 < q
WP
2 .
vi) and (vii) The changes in prices are the immediate result of changes in quantities.
Thus, both the increase in q1 and the decrease in q2 result in the decrease in p1 and the
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increase in p2:
viii). RWP =
5 3b2 2b(1 c) (2 c)c
16(1 b2) > 1=4 = 
R
MSD because of
5 3b2 2b(1 c) (2 c)c
16(1 b2) >
1
4 ,
5  3b2   2b(1  c)  (2  c)c > 4(1  b2),
(b+ c)2   2(b+ c) + 1 > 0, (1  b  c)2 > 0:
ix ). Substituting equilibriums values of prices and quantities for both cases of the
wholesale price and MSDs we get that the consumerssurpluses are:
CSWP = 5 4b
2+(b+c)2+(b+c)
32(1 b2) and CS
MSD = 18 . Hence, CS
WP > CSMSD, 5 4b2+(b+c)2+(b+c)
32(1 b2) >
1
8 , 1+ (b+ c)2  2(b+ c) > 0 , (1  b  c)2 > 0; and the last inequality is obviously true.
Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose, in the equilibrium the manufacturer sets fteL; teH ; seg and
the retailer does not meet the market share threshold, s 6= se. Because in the equilibrium
s 6= se; the level of the market threshold se has no e¤ects on quantities qe1, qe2.
Suppose that e = 1: In this case the equilibrium price (either teH if s < s
e or teL if
s > se) coincides with the price b!. But this contradicts to the assumption 1.3 which says
that the manufacturers prot is higher if its price is ! = 12(1  b+ c) and e = 0. Thus, if
e = 1 it must be that s = se.
Suppose that e = 0: Then because of s 6= se the manufacturers price (either teH if
s < se or teL if s > s
e) equals to its wholesale price ! = 12(1   b + c): As a result, the
equilibrium retailers prot is RMSD =
5 3b2 2b(1 c) (2 c)c
16(1 b2) >
1
4 .
Lets consider new menu of prices t0 = ft0L; t0H ; s0g in the form:8>>>><>>>>:
t0L = t
e
H
t0H = +1
s0 = se + 
,
where  > 0.
Now lets show that the new price t0 gives the higher prot to the manufacturer.
Because t0H = +1, the retailer have either to meet the market share threshold s0 or to
trade the competitive sectors rm good only. To exclude the manufacturers good from the
trade is not protable because in this case the retailer obtains its reservation prot only.
In the former case, the retailer has to adjust quantities qe1, q
e
2 to meet the market share
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threshold. The retailer may change its e¤ort level to e = 1 also. Regardless changes in the
e¤ort level, the optimal adjustment implies an increase in the manufacturers quantity q1.
Because of the continuity of the retailers prot function in q1and q2, for  small enough
the new retailers prot is still higher than its reservation prot. Thus, if the new menu of
prices t0 is o¤ered then the retailer chooses new quantity q01 > qe1. Given the manufacturers
price remains the same, t0L = t
e
H ; the prot of the manufacturer is higher. Thus, fteL; teH ; seg
were not the equilibrium values which contradicts to assumption.
Proof of Lemma 7. Suppose, in the equilibrium the manufacturer sets fteL; teH ; seg :
By Lemma 6 s = se:
Suppose the equilibrium level of the retailers e¤ort is e = 0: Then all arguments of the
Lemma 3 applied with small di¤erence in the following way.
First, MMSD(t
e
L; s
e) = q1(t
e
L; s
e)(teL   c) = s
e(1 seteL)
2(1 2se(1 b)(1 se))(t
e
L   c),
with @
M
MSD
@tL
= s
2(c 2tL)+s
2(1 2s(1 b)(1 s))  0 for any tL < (1+cs)2s .
Thus, for any given level of se, MMSD is non-decreasing in t
e
L function for tL <
(1+cs)
2s If
RMSD(t
e
L; s
e)

e=0 > 1=4; then the manufacturer may increase its prot by raising t
e
L. The
retailers response on an increase in teL may imply changes in the e¤ort level and in quantities
q1; q2. Regardless changes in the retailers e¤ort level, the prot of the manufacturers
increases for any tL <
(1+cs)
2s : The prot of the retailer decreases in tL and it is less then
1
4
at tL =
(1+cs)
2s :Thus, if e
 = 0, the optimal manufacturers price is such that RMSD

e=0
= 14 .
Now, suppose the equilibrium level of the retailers e¤ort is e = 1; and the retailers
prot is RMSD(t
e
L; s
e)

e=1
> 1=4. If the manufacturer increases its price to tL = t
e
L + ;
then the retailers response may imply changes in the e¤ort level and quantities q1; q2. If
the retailer changes the e¤ort level, then RMSD

e=0
= 14 as it was shown above. Given
that  > 0 is small enough, an adjustment in quantities still provide the retailer with
RMSD(t

L; s
e)

e=1
> 1=4: The prot of the manufacturer MMSD(tL; s)

e=1
increases, while
the retailers prot RMSD

e=1
decreases for t < 1+(A1 1)s+cs2s ; and 
R
MSD

e=1
< 1=4 if
t = 1+(A1 1)s+cs2s . Therefore, if e
 = 1, the manufacturers optimal price is such that
RMSD(tL; s)

e=1
= 1=4:
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CHAPTER II
EQUILIBRIUM PRODUCT VARIETY AND MARKET
STRUCTURE IN SUCCESSIVE OLIGOPOLIES
2.1 Introduction
In real world markets most of the rms produce multiple products. Yet, the economic
literature has traditionally assumed that rms are single-good producers (see e.g., Hotelling,
1929, Salop, 1979). In real world markets also most of the product manufacturers do not
sell their products directly to consumers. They sell them instead through retailers. In
other words, in most real world markets manufacturers produce multiple products, they sell
their products to retailers and the latter sell them to consumers. A typical example is the
food industry, where food processing rms produce a line of food products which they sell
through food retailers and supermarkets. Another example is car producers which sell their
products through independent retailers. The literature that has studied product variety in
markets characterized by successive oligopoly is scarce and has assumed that manufacturers
are single-product rms (see e.g., Reisinger and Schnitzer, 2008).
This paper aims to ll the gap between real world markets and economic theory by
analyzing successive oligopolies in which the manufacturers that operate in the markets
upstream tier have the option to produce a line of goods. All the manufacturersgoods
are imperfect substitutes and entry in the upstream market is endogenous. The number of
retailers that operate in the markets downstream tier is exogenously xed.1 Each retailer
can buy and resell to nal consumers all the manufacturers goods. Each manufacturer
incurs a cost that is increasing in the number of varieties that it produces.2 There are
1As we demonstrate, imperfect competition in a retailers level has a non-trivial impact on a market
outcome. One-tier multiproduct oligopoly can be obtained as a partial case by assuming perfect competition
among retailers.
2A similar approach is used in Alanson and Montagna (2005), Ottaviano et al. (2002), Chemla (2003),
Feenstra and Ma (2007).
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thus economies of scope in the creation of new products. Reselling costs are assumed to be
null. Consumerspreferences are described by a quadratic Dixit (1979)-type utility function
dened over all the varieties of the substitute goods o¤ered in the market. A multi-stage
game with observable actions is analyzed. In the beginning of the game, manufacturers
decide whether or not they will enter in the upstream market. In the following stage, each
manufacturer chooses the number of its products, i.e., product variety, and the wholesale
price of each of its products. In the nal stage, retailers buy the manufacturers goods and
resell them in the nal market by setting their quantities.3
Using the above described framework, we study the equilibrium market structure in
the upstream tier, that is, the number of manufacturers and the product variety o¤ered by
each manufacturer. Moreover, we explore the role of a number of market characteristics
such as the economies of scope, the degree of product substitutability and the number of
downstream retailers for market outcomes (i.e., number of upstream manufacturers, product
variety and wholesale prices). Their impact on consumerssurplus and total welfare is also
investigated. A comparison with the benchmark case of single-product manufacturers is
conducted.
We demonstrate that the equilibrium number of manufacturers as well as the number
of goods produced by each manufacturer depends crucially on the economies of scope.
When the economies of scope are weak, the number of manufacturers increases and each
manufacturer is single-product. When instead the economies of scope are too strong, a
single manufacturer produces all the goods. Intuitively, the strong economies of scope
translate into a lower cost of introducing an additional product in the market. Clearly, a
manufacturer has higher incentives to introduce more products in the market when the cost
of introducing them is lower. However, the higher product variety o¤ered by a manufacturer
increases the competition in the upstream tier and decreases in turn the entry incentives.
We also demonstrate that the product variety o¤ered by each manufacturer is higher
when there are more retailers in the downstream tier, as well as when the market is large.
3We assume that manufacturers make take-it-or-leave-it o¤er and retailers have no bargaining power. This
assumption is reasonable if a number of retailers is signicantly greater than a number of manufacturers.
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Both of these results are quite intuitive since when the market size is large and there are
more downstream customers the manufacturers enjoy higher demand for their products.
More surprising result is that both the market size and the downstream concentration have
no direct impact on the equilibrium number of manufacturers but they a¤ect it through
the equilibrium number of goods only. This allows showing that in fact the impact of the
market size and the downstream concentration on the equilibrium number of manufacturer
is negligible.
Comparing the case of multi-product manufacturers with the benchmark case in which
all the manufacturers are single-product, we nd that the wholesale prices are lower in lat-
ter case then in the former one. This occurs simply because a multi-product manufacturer
internalizes the positive e¤ect of an increase in the wholesale price of one of its products
on the demand of the rest of its products. It turns outs that the total number of products,
the total industrys output and the retailersprots are higher, in the case of multi-product
manufacturers than the respective ones in the case of single-product manufacturers. Regard-
ing welfare, numerical simulations indicate that both the consumerssurplus and the total
welfare increase with the intensity of the economies of scope, the product di¤erentiation
and the number of downstream rms.
The existing theoretical literature on product diversity suggests that product diversity
may be excessive or insu¢ cient depending on the relative strength of various e¤ects. Studies
of product diversity have been traditionally conducted using two alternative families of
models. On the one hand, spatial models of localized competition, similar to those proposed
by Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979) have been extensively used. On the other hand,
a large literature has followed Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and assumed
the existence of a representative consumer with well dened preferences over all possible
varieties. In this setup neighboring e¤ects are absent and each rm competes against "the
market". Both types of studies were made based typically on the assumption that an
individual rm produces one good only. However, as mentioned above the single-good
producing rm assumption is in stark contrast to reality where multi-product lines are a
commonplace.
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A number of more recent papers have started to investigate theoretically the behavior
of multi-product rms in the industrial organization literature, as well as in the literature
on international trade. Helpman (1985) has analyzed how a multinational rm will expand
over multiple product lines. He has constant-elasticity demands (CES preferences) in his
analysis and for this reason his model has not taken into account the implied e¤ect on the
markups of the rms, i.e., it has ignored the interaction of multiple products in demand.
Instead, Helpman has relied on diseconomies of scope to limit rmsexpansion into new
product lines. Di¤erent versions of Helpman (1985) there exist in more recent literature
dealing with CES preferences (see e.g., Allanson and Montagna, 2005, Bernard et al., 2006,
Brambilla, 2006).4 Departing from CES preferences, Nocke and Yeaple (2006) have used
a partial equilibrium inverse demand curve for every product produced by a rm. They
likewise have not taken into account the e¤ect of increases in a rms varieties on the
demand for its existing products but have assumed decreasing returns to the range of
products. Endogenous markups have been introduced using alternative preferences. More
specically, Anderson and de Palma (1992 and 2006) have considered a nested logit demand
function. Ottaviano at al. (2002) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) have assumed linear-
quadratic preferences. Eaton and Schmitt (1994), Norman and Thisse (1999), Eckel (2006),
and Eckel and Neary (2006) have analyzed multi-product rms in models of spatial product
di¤erentiation in a Salop-type circular market.5 In their settings, marginal costs increase
with the distance from a rmscore competence, such that diseconomies of scope limit rms
expansion over the product space in addition to the cannibalization e¤ect. Doraszelski and
Draganska (2006) have analyzed product di¤erentiation strategies in a duopoly by assuming
that rms can either produce general purpose products or products that are targeted to
a certain market segment. Finally, Hansen and Jurgensen (2001) and Hansen and Nielsen
(2007) have considered a linear demand function. In their model production strategies of
multi-product rms are determined by the inuence of the number of goods or the number
of plants on xed and variable costs. All of these papers have considered one-tier industries.
4Erkel-Rousse (1997) has considered vertical product di¤erentiation with multi-product rms and CES-
preferences.
5Blanchard at al. (2007) have analyzed product di¤erentiation in a Hotellings model with a linear market.
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A recent paper by Reisinger and Schnitzer (2008) has analyzed product variety in verti-
cally related industries. They have developed a model of successive oligopolies with endoge-
nous market entry, allowing for varying degrees of product di¤erentiation and entry costs in
both the upstream and the downstream market. They have analyzed how di¤erent forms of
vertical restraints inuence the endogenous market structure and show when they are wel-
fare enhancing. Although this paper has dealt with product variety in successive oligopolies,
in contrast to ours, it has assumed that upstream manufacturers are single-product.
Summing up, the existing literature has not provided a general model with multi-product
rms in vertically related oligopolies. One of the reasons for this lack is that such models
quickly become very complicated. A contribution of our paper is to provide such a model
that can be used for addressing a variety of issues that arise in vertically related industries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe our model. In
Section 2.3, we characterize the equilibrium when the number of manufacturers is given. In
Section 2.4, we endogenize the upstream market structure, that is, the number of manufac-
turers. We conclude in Section 2.5.
2.2 The Model
We consider a two-tier industry. The industrys upstream tier consists of M  1 product
manufacturers, each denoted by m, with m = 1; :::;M . The manufacturers sell their prod-
ucts to consumers through R  1 retailers that operate in the industrys downstream tier.
Each retailer is denoted by r, with r = 1; :::; R.
Each manufacturer m produces nm  1 di¤erent products. We assume that a marginal
cost of production of each unit of each product is zero6. The total number of products
produced by all manufacturers is N =
PM
m=1 nm. The total cost faced by each manufacturer
depends on the number of its products. More specically, the total cost of manufacturer m
is given by TCm = c(nm) = bnm, where  > 0 determines the rate of economies of scope in
the products creation process and b 2 (0; 1] denes the scale of the cost function. This cost
6As all goods in the model are symmetric we assume that marginal cost of production is the same for
each good and we normalize it to zero.
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can be thought as the cost of investing in R&D for the creation of new products. Obviously,
c0(nm) > 0 and c(1) > 0. The last condition implies that entry in the upstream tier is
costly.
Each manufacturer m sells its products to the retailers through linear wholesale price
contracts. That is, it sets a wholesale price, wmi , per unit of product i, i = 1; 2; :::; nm, that it
sells. We denote by fwm1 ; :::; wmnmg the vector of wholesale prices of manufacturerm. The re-
spective total vector of wholesale prices of all the products produced by all the manufacturers
is denoted by fw1; :::; wn1 ; wn1+1; :::; wn1+n2 ; :::; wNg  fw11; :::; w1n1 ; w21; :::; w2n2 ; :::; wM1 ; :::wMnN g,
where the rst n1 numbers are the wholesale prices of the products of the manufacturer 1,
the next n2 numbers are the wholesale prices of the products of the manufacturer 2 etc.
We assume that each retailer r faces no other cost than the cost of obtaining the products
from the manufacturers, i.e., the wholesale price wi per unit of product i
7. Each retailer
may buy and resell any number of products that are produced by the manufacturers and
may choose any quantity of each product8. We assume that each retailer will trade all
products in equilibrium. We denote by fqr1; :::; qrn1 ; qrn1+1; :::; qrn1+n2 ; :::; qrNg the vector of
quantities that the retailer r trades. The retailer r buys quantities fqr1; :::; qrn1g from the
manufacturer 1, quantities fqrn1+1; :::; qrn1+n2g from the manufacturer 2 etc. Qi stays for the
total quantity of product i sold in the market by all retailers, i.e., Qi =
PR
r=1 q
r
i , where
i = 1; 2; :::; N: Lets to determine Qmj such that
fQ11; :::; Q1n1 ; Q21; :::; Q2n2 ; :::; QM1 :::; QMnN g 
 fQ1; :::; Qn1 ; Qn1+1; :::; Qn1+n2 ; :::; QN nm ; :::; QNg;
i.e. if the manufacturerm produces nm goods then fQm1 ; :::; Qmnmg is a vector of its quantities
sold by the market.
The representative consumer has the following quadratic utility function:
U = A
NX
i=1
Qi   1
2
(
NX
i=1
Q2i + 
NX
i=1
NX
j=1
j 6=i
QiQj) + L; (15)
7We use this assumption as a standard simplication to increase tractability of the model.
8This setting is referred to as "multilateral transaction" in Fauli-Oller and Mesa-Sanchez (2007) because
there is no restriction in the products that retailers can buy.
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where L is the income spend on outside goods, A > 0, is the size of the market, and
 2 (0; 1), is the degree of product substitutability. Namely, the higher is  the closer
substitutes the products are. Note that for simplication reasons,  denotes the degree of
product substitutability both among the products of di¤erent manufacturers and among
the products of the same manufacturer.
From (15), we obtain the demand function for each product variety i sold by any retailer:
pi = A Qi   
NX
j=1
j 6=i
Qj :
It follows from the above that the prot function of each retailer r is given by:
Dr =
NX
i=1
(pi   wi)qri :
Respectively, the prot function of each manufacturer m is given by:
Um =
nmX
i=1
wmi Q
m
i   c(nm):
Competitive interactions are modeled as a two-stage game with observable actions. In
stage one, each manufacturer m chooses how many goods it will produce, nm, and sets
the wholesale prices of its products, fwm1 ; :::; wmnmg. In the following stage, stage two, each
retailer r buys the manufacturers products and chooses the quantities of each product
fqr1; :::; qrNg that it sells to the nal consumers.
The solution concept that we use is the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium in pure
strategies which we obtain using backward induction.
Note that in what follows we consider two di¤erent scenarios regarding entry in the
upstream tier. In the rst scenario, we assume that the number of manufacturers is exoge-
nous, i.e., it is xed and equal to M . In the second scenario, we endogenize the number
of manufacturers using the free-entry condition. More specically, we add one stage on the
above described game, stage zero, where manufacturers decide whether or not they will
enter in the upstream market.
Throughout, we use as a benchmark for comparisons the case in which each manufacturer
produces a single product. Manufacturerms cost function in this case is TCm = c(1). If N s
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is the equilibrium number of manufacturers under the free-entry condition in the benchmark
case then clearly N s is also the equilibrium number of products.
2.3 Equilibrium with M Manufacturers
In the last stage of the game, each retailer r chooses the quantity of each product in order
to maximize its prots, taking as given wholesale prices:
max
qr1 ;:::;q
r
N
Dr =
NX
i=1
(A Qi   
NX
j=1
j 6=i
Qj   wi)qri ; r = 1; :::; R; i = 1; :::; N; (16)
where qri is the quantity of product i sold by retailer r and wi is the wholesale price of good
i. The rst order conditions are:
@Dr
@qri
=  qri +A Qi   
NX
j=1
j 6=i
Qj   wi   
NX
j=1
j 6=i
qrj : (17)
Looking for the symmetric equilibrium, we assume that each retailer sells the same amount
of each product, that is, q1i = q
2
i = ::: = q
R
i = qi. Therefore, Qi = Rqi. Given this, the rst
order conditions (17) can be rewritten in the following way:9
@Dr
@qri
=  qi +A Rqi   
NX
j=1
j 6=i
Rqj   wi   
NX
j=1
j 6=i
qj :
Rearranging terms we have:
(R+ 1)(qi + 
NX
j=1
j 6=i
qj) = A  wi: (18)
The above system of rst order conditions (18) determines the equilibrium quantities as
functions of the wholesale prices and of the total number of goods N :
qi(w1; :::; wN ) =
(1   + (N   1))(A  wi)  
PN
k=1
k 6=i
(A  wk)
(1 +R)(1  )(1   + N) : (19)
The respective total demand for manufacturers product i isQn(w1; :::; wN ) = Rqi(w1; :::; wN ):
9We discuss the conditions that ensure the existence of interior solutions in the model later on.
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In the previous stage, stage two, each manufacturer m chooses the wholesale prices of
its products, as well as the number of its products in order to maximize its prots:
max
wm1 ;:::;w
m
nm
; nm
Um =
nmX
i=1
wmi Q
m
i   c(nm); (20)
where Qmi = Rq
m
i is the total amount of the good i of manufacturer m sold by all retailers.
To derive the rst order conditions for the manufacturersproblems for a symmetric
equilibrium it is convenient to assume that all manufacturers but the manufacturer 1 choose
the same product variety, n2 = n3 = ::: = nM = n and set the same prices for all their goods
(wn1+1 = wn1+2 = ::: = wN = w) while manufacturer 1 chooses its variety n1 and sets the
price w11 for its rst good and the price w
1 for the rest of its goods, w12 = ::: = w
1
n1 = w
1.
Given this, the total number of goods may be written as N = (M   1)n+ n1. Now by (19)
we have that:
q11(w
1
1; w
1; n1; w; n) =
(1  )(A  w11) + (M   1)n(w   w11) + (n1   1)(w1   w11)
(1 +R)(1  )(1   + ((M   1)n+ n1))
q1(w11; w
1; n1; w; n) =
(1  )(A  w1) + (M   1)n(w   w1) + (w11   w1)
(1 +R)(1  )(1   + ((M   1)n+ n1)) ;
where q11 is the demand for the good 1 of the manufacturer 1 and q
1 is the demand for the
rest of its goods in terms of w11; w
1; n1; w and n.
Here and thereafter we abstract from the fact that n1 is integer-valued. Then we rewrite
manufacturer 1s prot as:
U1 (w
1
1; w
1; n1; n) = w
1
1Rq
1
1 + (n1   1)w1Rq1   c(n1): (21)
Di¤erentiating (21) with respect to w1 and n1 we obtain:8><>:
@U1
@w11
= R1+R
A(1 )+(M 1)nw 2(n1 1)w1 2(1 +((M 1)n+n1 1))w11
(1 )(1 +((M 1)n+n1)
@U1
@n1
= R1+R
(A(1 )+(M 1)n(w w1) w1+w11))((1+(M 1)n)w1 w11)
(1 )(1 +((M 1)n+n1)2   abn 1+a1
: (22)
The system of the rst order conditions for the symmetric equilibrium is:8><>:
@U1
@w =
R
1+R
A(1 ) (2(1 )+(M 1)n)w
(1 )(1 +Mn)  0
@U1
@n =
R(A w)w
1+R
1 +(M 1)n
(1 +Mn)2   abn 1+a  0
: (23)
Whenever there exists an internal solution to (23), it is determined implicitly by the fol-
lowing system of equations:
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8><>: w
 = A(1 )2(1 )+(M 1)n
R(A w)w
1+R
1 +n(M 1)
(1 +Mn)2 = abn
 1+a
(24)
Note that the derivative of the manufacturers prots with respect to w11 is positive at
point w11 = 0:
@U1
@w11

n1=n;w1=w;w11=0
=
R
1 +R
A(1  ) + w(Mn+ n  2)
(1  )(1   + Mn) > 0:
Therefore, the optimal w is always positive. It follows that if there exists a corner solution
of (23) then it is given by w = A(1 )2(1 )+(M 1) and n
 = 1:
Next, we discuss the second order conditions and the existence of a symmetric equilib-
rium. It is easy to see that the second derivative of the manufacturer 1s prot function
with respect to any of its wholesale prices is negative: @
2U1
@w2i
=   2(1 +((M 1)n+n1 1))(1 )(1 +((M 1)n+n1) < 0;
for any M  1; n  1; n1  1 and i = 1; :::; n1. Thus, the manufacturers prot function
is strictly concave in every of its wholesale prices for any n1 and therefore there exists a
unique point of maximum with respect to any its wholesale price. From this we conclude
that, whenever a symmetric equilibrium exists, the wholesale price w = A(1 )2(1 )+(M 1)n
is indeed the maximizer of the manufacturers prots function for any n1.
Remark 1. The internal symmetric equilibrium exists for any xed n with equilibrium
price w = A(1 )2(1 )+(M 1)n . In particular this implies that in the case of single-good
producers we have that w = A(1 )2(1 )+(M 1) :
Plugging w = A(1 )2(1 )+(M 1)n into (21) we get the prots of manufacturer 1 as a
function of n1 and n :
U1 (n1; n
)

w11=w
1=w(n) = (25)
=
A2R
1 +R
(1  )(1   + n(M   1))n1
(2(1  ) + (M   1)n)2(1   + (M   1)n + n1)   bn
a
1:
Note that the manufacturer 1s prot function (25) in general is neither concave nor quasi-
concave in n1. Therefore, it is not necessary that the solution of the rst order conditions
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(w; n) provides a point of maximum. Indeed, the solution of (23), (w; n); is the sym-
metric solution of the manufacturers problem (20) if and only if n1 = n is the maximizer
of (25).
Example 10 Lets consider the set of parameters: M = 2;  = 0:6; A = 10; b = 0:1; R = 4
and a = f0:43; 0:55; 0:7g.
- a = 0:43 (Figure 1): U1 (n1; n) is neither concave nor quasiconcave in n1; the solution of
the FOCs (24) is fn = 181:7; w = 0:08g and it is a point of local maximum of U1 (n1; n).
The point of global maximum of U1 (n1; n
)

n=181:7 is fn1 = 1; w = 0:08g.
- a = 0:55 (Figure 2): U1 (n1; n) is neither concave nor quasiconcave in n1; the solu-
tion of the FOC (24) is fn = 102:3; w = 0:14g and it is a point of global maximum of
U1 (n1; n
)

n=102:3.
- a = 0:7 (Figure 3):. U1 (n1; n) is quasiconcave in n1; the solution of the FOC (24) is
fn = 57:9; w = 0:25g and it is a point of global maximum of U1 (n1; n)

n=57:9.
Figure 1: Case 1.
The system (24) is equivalent to the following whenever there exists an internal solution
to the manufacturers maximization problem (20):
A2R(1  )(1   + (M   1)n))2
(1 +R)(2(1  ) + (M   1)n)2(1 + (Mn   1))2 = abn
a 1; (26)
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Figure 2: Case 2.
Figure 3: Case 3.
where the left and the right sides are the marginal revenue and the marginal cost (in terms
of the product variety n) of each manufacturer in the symmetric equilibrium.
Assumption 2.1. Suppose that a set of parameters fA;R;M; a; b; g is such that
A2R(1  )(1   + (M   1))2
(1 +R)(2(1  ) + (M   1))2(1 + (M   1))2 > ab:
The condition implies that the marginal revenue of each manufacturer is greater than
its marginal cost at the point n = 1,wjn=1 = A(1 )2(1 )+(M 1) and thus the prot of each
manufacturer increases in n.
Lemma 11 The system of the rst order conditions (23) has a unique internal solution on
n 2 (1;+1) if and only if Assumption 2.1 holds.
Assumption 2.2. Suppose that fA;R;M; a; b; g and n > 1 determined by (26) are
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such that
@U1
@n1
(n1; n
)
w11=w(n)
w1=w(n)
n1=1
=
=
A2R(1  )(1   + (M   1)n))2
(1 +R)(2(1  ) + (M   1)n)2(1 + (M   1)n)2   ab > 0:
The condition @
U
1
@n1
(n1; n
)
w11=w1=w(n)
n1=1
> 0 means that the prot of the manufacturer
1 increases in n1 at the point n1 = 1 given that n > 1, where n is determined by (26).
Lemma 12 The prot function (25) is quasiconcave and has a unique internal maximum
on n1 2 [1;+1) if and only if Assumption 2.2 holds.
Combining Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 we obtain the following result.
Proposition 13 Suppose that Assumption 2.1 and 2.2 hold together. Then the system of
the rst order conditions (23) determines the unique internal symmetric equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 13. Follows immediately from Lemma 11 and Lemma 12.
Lets note that a unique internal solution of the manufacturersmaximization problem
(20) may exist even if Assumptions 2.1-2.2 do not hold and manufacturers prot functions
are not quasiconcave. Thus, Assumption 2.1 and 2.2 together are su¢ cient for quasicon-
cavity of the manufacturersprot functions and for uniqueness of the internal solution of
the problem (20).
Plugging w = A(1 )2(1 )+(M 1)n into (19), (20) and (16), we obtain the equilibrium
quantities, as well as the equilibrium prots and the total industrys output as functions of
n:
q = qn =
A
1 +R
1   + n(M   1)
(2(1  ) + (M   1)n)(1   + Mn) ; (27)
U = Um =
A2R
1 +R
n
(1  )(1   + n(M   1))
(2(1  ) + (M   1)n)2(1   + Mn)   c(n
); (28)
D = Dr =
A2Mn
(1 +R)2
(1   + n(M   1))2
(2(1  ) + (M   1)n)2(1   + Mn) ; (29)
TQ =MnRq =Mn
AR
1 +R
1   + n(M   1)
(2(1  ) + (M   1)n)(1   + Mn) : (30)
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The respective nal price is:
p =
A((2 +R)(1  ) + (M   1)n)
(1 +R)(2(1  ) + (M   1)n) : (31)
Finally, one could obtain the equilibrium consumerssurplus using (15), as well as the
total welfare dened as the sum of the consumers surplus and the rmsprots:
CS =
A2MR2n
2(1 +R)2
(1   + n(M   1))2
(2(1  ) + n(M   1))2(1   + Mn) ; (32)
W  =
A2MR(2 +R)n
2(1 +R)2
(1   + n(M   1))2
(2(1  ) + n(M   1))2(1   + Mn) +M
U : (33)
Setting n = 1 in the equilibrium expressions (27)-(33), we obtain the respective equilib-
rium expressions for the benchmark case with single-product manufacturers. In particular,
the equilibrium wholesale price and the manufacturers prots in the benchmark are:
ws =
A(1  )
2(1  ) + (N s   1) ; (34)
Us =
RA2(1  )(1 + (N s   2))
(1 +R)((2 + (N s   3))2(1 + (N s   1))   c(1) (35)
:
The next Proposition compares the multi-product manufacturers wholesale prices with
the ones of a single-product manufacturer for the same level of total product variety.
Proposition 14 Suppose that Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold. When the number of manu-
facturers in the benchmark case N s is such that N s = Mn then the equilibrium wholesale
price in the benchmark case is lower than the equilibrium wholesale price in the case of
multi-product manufacturers, ws < w.
Proof. N s =Mn ) N s   1 =Mn   1 > Mn   n = (M   1)n ) ws < w.
According to Proposition 14, the equilibrium wholesale prices are higher when the man-
ufacturers are multi-product than when they are single-product. This nding is driven by
the impact of a change in the wholesale price of a product on the demand for the rest of
the products. More specically, if a multi-product manufacturer increases the wholesale
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price of one of its products then it will increase the demand for the products of its rival
manufacturers, as well as in the demand for the rest of its own products. The latter is a pos-
itive e¤ect. The multi-product manufacturer internalizes this e¤ect and keeps its wholesale
prices higher than a single good producer.
Next, we analyze the role of a number of market characteristics for the market equilib-
rium. We start by examining the impact of concentration in the upstream market sector.
Proposition 15 Suppose Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold for some M1;M2 2 N with 1 <
M1 < M2. Then the product variety o¤ered by each manufacturer n, as well as the equi-
librium prots of each manufacturer decrease in M in the sense that n(M1) > n(M2) > 1
and Um (M1) > Um (M2).
Remark 2. Lets note that the result of the Proposition holds for M 2 Z and does
not imply that LS(n;M) decreases on [1; 2]. Actually for a xed n the left side of (12) is
not monotone in M 2 [1;+1), it has one point of maximum at fM : 1 < fM < 2 and thus
LS(n;M) increases on the interval [1;fM ] and decreases on [fM ; +1].
Proposition 15 asserts that the more manufacturers are in the upstream market, and thus
the less concentrated the upstream market is, the less is the product variety o¤ered by each
of them, as well as the lower are each manufacturers prots. Intuitively, a higher number
of manufacturers clearly means stronger competition among them. When competition is
strong, the manufacturers incentives to insert a new product in the market are reduced.
This occurs because due to the intensity of competition the new product will not be so
protable.
Proposition 16 Suppose that Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold on some set of fA;R;M; a; b; g.
Then the equilibrium variety of each rm n increases in R;A and decreases in ; b; the
equilibrium wholesale price w increases in ; b and decreases in R on this set.
In order to examine the role of the number of retailers, as well as of the economies of
scope and of product substitutability we resort to numerical simulations. We do so because
the system (26) that determines endogenously the equilibrium values of the wholesale prices
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and of the number of products (w; n) does not have a solution in closed form. Thus, it is
not possible to perform a comparative statics analysis for all of the market characteristics
analytically. We start by setting values for of parameters round the point: R = 4;M =
2;  = 0:6; A = 10; b = 0:1, and  = 0:7. In order to examine the impact of the number of
retailers R we allow for di¤erent values for R.
R n Mn U w TQ D CS W 
2 25.43 50.87 .37 .25 10.69 17.38 34.75 70.26
3 27.35 54.69 .39 .23 12.06 9.81 44.18 74.41
4 28.45 56.90 .40 .22 12.88 6.29 50.38 76.37
5 29.16 58.34 .41 .22 13.43 4.37 54.74 77.12
6 29.67 59.35 .41 .21 13.82 3.22 57.97 78.11
50 32.21 64.42 .44 .20 15.85 .061 76.15 80.08
1 32.6 65.20 .44 .19 16.17 0 79.27 80.16
Table 1: The impact of R for given M.
It follows from Table 1 that the more retailers (higher R) are in the market, the higher is
the product variety of each manufacturer and the total variety, the manufacturers prots,
the total output, the consumers surplus and the total welfare. These results are quite
intuitive: the stronger is competition among retailers the lower are their prices and therefore
the higher are quantities sold. Thus manufacturers prots and consumers surplus are
higher.
Next, we examine the impact of the intensity of the economies of scope by considering
di¤erent values of a.
 n Mn U w TQ D CS W 
0.7 28.45 56.89 .400 .22 12.88 6.30 50.38 76.37
0.8 21.68 43.36 .675 .28 12.75 6.19 49.52 75.64
0.9 17.12 34.25 0.99 .36 12.61 6.08 48.60 74.88
1 13.92 27.84 1.32 .44 12.45 5.95 47.63 74.11
1.1 11.59 23.18 1.68 .51 12.29 5.83 46.63 73.32
Table 2: The impact of alpha for given M.
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As Table 2 indicates the smaller is ; and thus, the stronger are the economies of scope,
the higher is product variety and the lower are the manufacturers prots. The intuition is
that the strong economies of scope translate into a lower cost of introducing an additional
product in the market. Clearly, a manufacturer has higher incentives to introduce more
products in the market when the cost of introducing them is lower. However, the higher
product variety o¤ered by each manufacturer increases the competition in the upstream
level leading in turn to lower manufacturers prots. As Table 2 also shows, due to the
higher product variety, the total output, the consumerssurplus and the total welfare are
also higher when the economies of scope are stronger.
 n Mn U w TQ D CS W 
0.5 40.10 80.20 0.50 .23 15.42 7.53 60.24 91.38
0.6 28.44 56.89 0.40 .22 12.88 6.29 50.38 76.37
0.7 20.11 40.21 0.31 .20 11.08 5.42 43.40 65.73
0.8 13.60 27.21 0.24 .17 9.73 4.78 38.24 57.84
0.9 7.93 15.87 0.16 .13 8.71 4.29 34.34 51.63
Table 3: The impact of gamma for given M.
In the above table, Table 3, we examine the role of product substitutability . As one
can see, the smaller is  and thus the more di¤erentiated are the products, the higher is
product variety, the higher are the manufacturers prots as well as the consumers surplus
and the total welfare. Intuitively, the manufacturers have stronger incentives to o¤er more
products when these products do not compete ercely among them. However, not only
the manufacturers but also the consumers and the retailers benet from the higher product
variety. Thus, welfare is also higher when  is low.
Considering the impact of the cost function parameter b we nd the following:
Table 4 indicates that the higher is the cost of production b the lower is the total variety
produced by each manufacturer and the total number of goods. Moreover the higher b
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b n Mn U w TQ D CS W 
0.2 18.53 37.07 0.58 .33 12.65 6.12 48.93 74.56
0.3 14.35 28.71 .71 .42 12.47 5.97 47.79 73.11
0.4 11.94 23.88 .82 .5 12.32 5.85 46.80 71.85
0.5 10.33 20.66 .91 .57 12.18 5.74 45.93 70.73
0.6 9.16 18.33 .99 .63 12.04 5.64 45.13 69.69
0.7 8.27 16.54 1.06 .69 11.93 5.55 44.40 68.73
0.8 7.56 15.12 1.13 .75 11.81 5.46 43.71 67.83
0.9 6.98 13.95 1.19 .80 11.70 5.38 43.06 66.97
Table 4: The impact of b for given M.
corresponds to the higher manufacturersprots while both the consumerssurplus and the
total welfare decrease in b:
Finally, we analyze the impact of changes inM for the set of parameters R = 4;  = 0:6;
A = 10; b = 0:1, and  = 0:9.
M n Mn U w TQ D CS W 
2 17.12 34.25 .99 .36 12.60 6.08 48.6 74.88
3 11.27 33.82 .30 .28 12.71 6.18 49.42 75.03
4 8.35 33.40 .13 .25 12.74 6.21 49.68 75.04
5 6.61 33.04 .07 .24 12.75 6.22 49.80 75.02
6 5.46 32.75 .03 .23 12.76 6.23 49.86 75.00
7 4.64 32.49 .02 .22 12.77 6.24 49.90 74.98
8 4.03 32.27 .01 .23 12.77 6.24 49.92 74.96
9 3.56 32.07 .003 .22 12.77 6.24 49.94 74.94
10 3.19 31.90 -.0006 .22 12.77 6.24 49.95 74.92
11 2.98 31.74 -.003 .22 12.77 6.24 49.95 74.90
12 2.63 31.59 -.005 .22 12.77 6.24 49.96 74.89
Table 5: The impact of M.
Table 5 demonstrates that while an increase in M has a strong negative e¤ect on the
variety of each rm n it has only week negative e¤ects on the total variety, the total quantity
and the nal price and therefore the week (positive) e¤ect on the consumerssurplus. The
manufacturers prot decreases in M while the total welfare in non-monotone in M . Also
Table 5shows that the highest variety is o¤ered by a monopoly and that the socially optimal
number of rms is such that all manufacturers get positive prot.
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2.4 Endogenous Number of Manufacturers
In this Section, we do no longer treat the number of manufacturersM as exogenous. Instead,
we endogenize it by imposing the free entry condition, that is, Um(M
) = 0.
Whenever there exists the internal solution of FOCs (22), that is n > 1, it is determined
by the system of (26) which may be written as
A2R(1  )(1   + Mn   n)n
(1 +R)(2  2 + Mn   n)2(1   + Mn) = bn
 1   + Mn
1   + (M   1)n :
Then the manufacturers prot function (??) is U = bn( 1 +Mn

1 +(M 1)n   1) and clearly
it is positive for any   1.
Therefore, if   1 then if the free-entry equilibrium exists it must be that n = 1. The
following proposition asserts that such an equilibrium indeed exists for any   1.
Proposition 17 Suppose that A2  8b. Under the free-entry condition for any   1
the system (22) has a corner solution only, that is for any   1, n = 1. Moreover,
the equilibrium number of manufacturers is the same as in the benchmark case, that is
M = N s:
The Proposition 17 says that if the production function exhibits diseconomy of scope
then each manufacturer produces one good only and the equilibrium is the same as one in
the case of singe-good producers. The intuition for this result is the following. A cost of
entering market (b) is lower than the cost of creation of one additional product (bn) by
existing producers. Thus each manufacturer produces one good only and the number of
rms coincides with equilibrium number of rms in the benchmark case.
Now lets consider the case  < 1:Whenever an internal solution of FOCs which satises
the free-entry condition (26) exists it is determined by the system:8><>: 
U = A
2R(1 )(1 +(M 1)n)n
(1+R)(2(1 )+(M 1)n)2(1 +Mn)   bn = 0
@U
@n =
A2R(1 )(1 +Mn n)2
(1+R)(2 2+Mn n)2(1 +Mn)2   bn 1 = 0
; (36)
where the rst equation is the free entry condition and the second is the rst order condition
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in terms of n. Equivalently the system (36) may be written in the form of:8><>: M
 = 11    1 n
(1 )2A2R(1 )n
(1+R)((1 )(1 )+n)2 = bn

; (37)
and the equilibrium wholesale price as a function of n is given by:
w =
(1  )(1  )A
(1  )(1  ) + n : (38)
Using M = 11    1 n we may rewrite Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 as the following.
Assumption 2.1. Suppose that a set of parameters fA;R; a; b; g is such that
(1  )2A2(1  )R
(1 +R)((1  )(1  ) + ) > b:
Assumption 2.2. Suppose that fA;R; a; b; g and n > 1 determined by the second
equation in (37) are such that
(1  )2A2(1  )Rn2
(1 +R)(1  + n)2((1  )(1  ) + n)2  b:
It is straightforward corollary of Proposition 4 that Assumptions 2.1and 2.2ensure
that manufacturersprot functions are quasiconcave and there exists the unique internal
solution. Lets note that in the benchmark case each manufacturer produces one good only
and thus the equilibrium number of producers is determined by
A2R(1  )(1   + (N s   1))
(1 +R)(2(1  ) + (N s   1))2(1   + N s) = b
while the equilibrium wholesale price is ws = A(1 )2(1 )+(Ns 1) :
In order to obtain additional results we need an assumption that guarantees that  and
 are not close to zero together.
Assumption 2.3. Suppose  +  > 1:
Lemma 18 Under Assumption 2.3 the free entry condition U (M;n) = 0 determined im-
plicitly the function M(n) such that dMdn < 0 and
d(Mn)
dn > 0:
Lemma 18 asserts that the higher the variety produced by each manufacturer the lower
the equilibrium number of manufacturers and the higher the total variety. It follows imme-
diately that d(Mn)dM < 0 and thus the higher the equilibrium number of manufacturers in the
equilibrium the lower the total variety.
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Proposition 19 Suppose Assumptions 2.1,2.2 and 2.3 hold together. Then the number
of manufacturers in the benchmark case is higher than the one in the case of multiproduct
rms while the total variety in the benchmark case is lower than the one in the case of
multiproduct rms, that is M < N s;Mn > N s.
Proof of Proposition. Under Assumption 2.1and 2.2there exists an internal equi-
librium with n > 1: According to Lemma 18 under Assumption 3.3 the equilibrium number
of manufacturers decreases in n while the total variety increases in n and thus M < N s
and Mn > N s.
Proposition 19 says that, while the number of manufacturers in the benchmark case is
higher, the total variety produced is lower comparing to the case of multiproduct rms.
In order to describe the e¤ect of the economy of scale on the equilibrium outcome we
provide the following Lemma.
Lemma 20 Suppose Assumptions 2.1,2.2and 2.3 hold together for any  :  <  < .
Then the equilibrium values M and n are such that dM

d > 0;
d(M 1)n
d < 0;
d(Mn)
d <
0; dn

d < 0 for  <  < :
Plugging (37) into (27)-(33) we obtain the following characterization of the symmetric
equilibrium when M is endogenous:
q = q =
aA (1  a)
(1 +R)(an + (1  )(1  a)) ; (39)
TQ =
RaA(n   (1  )(1  a))
(1 +R)(an + (1  )(1 + a)) ; (40)
D =
a2A2n(n   (1  )(1  a))
(1 +R)2(an + (1  )(1  a))2 ; (41)
CS =
R2a2A2n(n   (1  )(1  a))
2(1 +R)2(an + (1  )(1  a))2 ; (42)
W  =
R(2 +R)a2A2n(n   (1  )(1  a))
2(1 +R)2(an + (1  )(1  a))2 : (43)
One might wonder how the competition in the downstream market (measured in terms
of both product substitutability and number of retailers), the economies of scope and the
market size a¤ect the manufacturersentry incentives, the retailers prots, the consumers
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surplus and the total welfare. We are in the position to obtain analytical results for the
case in which each manufacturer produces a high number of products. More specically,
when the parameters f; ; b; A;Rg are such that n is high enough (or in other words 1=n
is negligible) then in the internal equilibrium we have: TQ = RA(1+R) ; 
D = A
2
(1+R)2
;
CS = A
2R2
2(1+R)2
; TW  = A
2R(2+R)
2(1+R)2
; and M = 11  : From these equilibrium expressions,
it follows that the stronger are the economies of scope (lower a), the fewer manufacturers
enter into the market (lower M). Moreover, it follows that the market size A, the scale of
production cost b, as well the number of retailers R do not a¤ect the equilibrium number
of manufacturers M. Instead, the total industry output, the consumerssurplus and the
total welfare increase in both A and R and decrease in .
In order to draw conclusions for lower values of n, we have to resort again to numerical
simulations. This is so because the system (37 - 38) that describes implicitly the equilibrium
values of the wholesale prices and of the number of goods (w; n) when the number of
manufacturers is endogenous does not have a closed form solution. We provide simulation
for parameters values around point  = 0:8, A = 10; b = 0:1, and  = 0:8. Table 6 includes
some results regarding the role of the number of retailers R. The number of retailers has
a signicant impact on total output, consumers surplus and welfare in both multi- and
single-product manufacturers cases.
It is not surprising that in the benchmark case an increase in downstream competition
(i.e. higher R) leads to an increase in both the number of manufacturers N s and their total
output TQs. In the case of multiproduct manufacturers it inuences each manufacturers
product variety n and the total output TS but in contrast to the benchmark case it
almost has no e¤ect on the number of manufacturers M. These ndings are in line with
Proposition 19 and with our discussion of the case in which n  !1. Thus one prediction
of our model is that while a stronger competition in the downstream tier results in a higher
manufacturers product variety its e¤ect on the number of manufacturers is negligible.
The following Table provides some results regarding the impact of the economies of
48
R n M Mn N s TQ TQs D Ds CS CSs TW  TW s
1 3.06 4.92 15.07 12.50 6.02 6.00 29.52 29.37 14.76 14.69 44.28 44.06
2 3.61 4.93 17.78 14.43 8.08 8.05 13.23 13.17 26.47 26.33 52.93 52.66
3 3.85 4.94 19.03 15.31 9.11 9.07 7.47 7.43 33.60 33.43 56.00 55.72
4 4.00 4.94 19.74 15.81 9.72 9.68 4.79 4.76 38.29 38.10 57.44 57.15
5 4.09 4.94 20.21 16.14 10.13 10.01 3.33 3.31 41.59 41.38 58.23 57.94
6 4.16 4.94 20.54 16.37 10.43 10.38 2.45 2.43 44.03 43.81 58.71 58.42
51 4.48 4.94 22.18 17.51 11.96 11.91 0.05 0.04 57.83 57.54 60.10 59.80
1 4.54 4.94 22.43 17.68 12.19 12.15 0 0 60.14 59.85 60.14 59.85
Table 6: The impact of R with endogenous M.
scope.
 n M nM N s TQ TQs D Ds CS CSs TW  TW s
0.8 4.00 4.93 19.74 15.81 9.73 9.68 4.79 4.76 38.29 38.10 57.44 57.15
0.85 2.73 6.58 17.95 15.81 9.71 9.68 4.78 4.76 38.21 38.10 57.31 57.15
0.90 1.68 9.85 16.58 15.81 9.69 9.68 4.77 4.76 38.14 38.10 57.20 57.15
0.93 1.13 14.07 15.94 15.81 9.68 9.68 4.76 4.76 38.11 38.10 57.16 57.15
Table 7: The impact of alpha with endogenous M.
From Table 7 it follows that  inuences both the number of manufacturers and the
manufacturers product variety and its impact on both is signicant. In line with the
case in which n  ! 1 we see again that the stronger are the economies of scope (lower
a), the higher is both the total product variety and the product variety o¤ered by each
manufacturer. Moreover, we see that the stronger are the economies of scope, the fewer
manufacturers enter into the market (lower M). At the same time, a has a "moderate"
impact on total output, consumerssurplus and welfare.
 n M Mn N s TQ TQs D Ds CS CSs W  W s
0.8 4.00 4.94 19.74 15.81 9.72 9.68 4.79 4.76 38.29 38.10 57.44 57.15
0.85 3.19 4.94 15.79 13.04 9.18 9.15 4.53 4.51 36.22 36.09 54.33 54.14
0.90 2.40 4.95 11.89 10.22 8.71 8.69 4.30 4.29 34.42 34.35 51.63 51.53
0.95 1.54 4.97 7.65 7.07 8.29 8.29 4.11 4.11 32.89 32.87 49.34 49.30
Table 8: The impact of gamma with endogenous M.
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Table 8 shows that product substitutability almost has no e¤ect on the equilibrium num-
ber of manufacturers M . However, it has a big impact on each manufacturers equilibrium
product variety n. As expected, the closer substitutes the products are (higher ) and thus
the ercer is the competition the lower are the retailers prots.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed and analyzed a successive oligopoly model with multi-
product manufacturers. Both the case of exogenous number of manufacturers and en-
dogenous entry in the markets upstream tier are considered. For each case we provide
su¢ cient conditions for quasiconcavity of manufacturersprot functions and for existence
and uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. Also we have analyzed the
impact of the downstream market structure, the market size, parameters of both consumers
preferences and production on the product variety, the number of manufacturers as well as
the rmsprots and welfare.
For the case of exogenous number of manufacturers the main results are the following.
For any degree of the economy of scope there may exists equilibrium where each manu-
facturer produce more then one good when the number of manufacturers is not big. The
product variety produced by each manufacturer, the total product variety, the total output
decrease as the number of manufacturers increases while the social surplus and the total
welfare increases provided that manufacturersprots are positive. The higher degree of
diseconomy of scope corresponds to lower variety produced by each manufacturer, total
product variety, both social and total welfare but to higher manufacturersprots.
We demonstrate that under free entree condition the equilibrium conguration of the
upstream tier crucially depends on the economies of scope in the process of new products
creation. When the production technology exhibits diseconomy of scope then in equilibrium
each manufacturer produces only one product. Thus the su¢ ciently high degree of the
economy of scope is necessary in order each manufacturer produces more than one good.
The stronger is competition at the downstream level the higher is product variety produced
by each manufacturer and the total product variety while the number of manufacturers
50
increases very slightly.
Throughout we have restricted our attention to the case where the number of down-
stream retailers is given and trading between the manufacturers and the retailers takes place
through linear wholesale price contracts. It would be interesting to attempt to endogenize
the structure of the downstream tier too by including a xed entry cost and to consider
di¤erent forms of vertical contracts such as two-part tari¤s.
Our model provides a useful framework for addressing a variety of questions that arise
in vertically related markets as well as for empirical analysis and policy experiments. For
instance, it would be interesting to introduce di¤erent tax regimes for the upstream and
downstream rms and analyze the optimal tax structure.
In our model we assume that manufacturers makes take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to retailers.
This seems to be reasonable whenever we consider industries where the number of retail-
ers is greater then the number of manufacturers. In contrast, if the number of retailers is
comparable to (or lower than) the number of manufacturers then it is a restrictive assump-
tion. To cover such cases, we need to extend the model assuming that retailers have some
bargaining power. We leave it for the further research.
2.6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 11. First, lets show that the equation (26) has no more than two roots
on n 2 R+. Taking into account that all expressions insight brackets with power two are
positive, that is (2(1   ) + (M   1)) > 0, 1    + (M   1) > 0, 1 + (M   1) > 0, on
n 2 R+; w.l.g. we may rewrite (26) in the form of
(
r
R(1  )
1 +R
Aab)n
a 1
2 (1 +(M  1)n)) = (2(1 )+(M  1)n)(1+(Mn 1))
where the left side is a strictly increasing function and the right side is a quadratic function.
It is obvious that there can not exist more than two roots of the last equation on n 2 R+
and therefore (26) has also not more than two roots on n 2 R+.
Su¢ ciency. Suppose Assumption 2.1 holds. Then the left side of (26) is greater than its
right side at n = 1. Obviously, the left side of (26) is smaller than its right side for big n
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and thus there are odd number of roots of (26) on n 2 (1;+1). Given that there (26) has
no more than two roots on n 2 R+ we conclude that if Assumption 2.1 holds then there
exists a unique root on n 2 (1;+1).
Necessity holds trivially.
Proof of Lemma 12. First, lets show that the equation @
U
1
@n1
(n1; n
)
w11=w(n)
w1=w(n)
= 0
has not more than two roots on n1 2 R+.
On n1 2 R+ the number of roots of the equation
@U1
@n1
(n1; n
)
w11=w(n)
w1=w(n)
=
=
A2R(1  )(1   + (M   1)n)2
(1 +R)(2(1  ) + (M   1)n)2(1   + (M   1)n + n1)2   abn
a 1
1 = 0
is not bigger than the maximum number of roots of
A2R(1  )(1   + (M   1)n)2
(1 +R)(2(1  ) + (M   1)n)2
1
ab
n1 a1 = (1 + (M   1)n + n1)2
where the left side is a strictly increasing function and the right side is a quadratic function.
Therefore the maximum number of roots is two. Second, lets note that @
U
1
@n1
(n1; n
)

w11=w
1=w(n)
<
0 when n1 big enough .
Su¢ ciency. Suppose Assumption 2.2 holds. Then @
U
1
@n1
(n1; n
)

w11=w
1=w(n)
> 0 at
n1 = 1 and therefore the equation
@U1
@n1
(n1; n
)

w11=w
1=w(n)
= 0 has an odd number of
roots on n1 2 (1;+1). Because there can not exist more than two roots we conclude
that there exists a unique root on n1 2 (1;+1). By Assumption 2.1, we have also that
U1 (n1; n
) increases at n1 = 1 and therefore its unique point of extremum is the point of
maximum. Therefore (25) is a quasiconcave function.
Necessity holds trivially.
Proof of Proposition 15. First, lets show that the left side of (26) is a decreasing func-
tion inM for anyM > 2 and any xed n. Lets LS(n;M) = A
2R(1 )(1 +(M 1)n))2
(1+R)(2(1 )+(M 1)n)2(1+(Mn 1))2 :
Then it is easy to see that
@LS
@M
=  2A
2R(1  )
(1 +R)

n(1   + n(M   1))((1  )
2 + ((1  )(2M   3)n+ (M   1)2n2))
(2(1  ) + n(M   1))3(1   + Mn)3 < 0
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for any M > 2:
Now, lets to show that LS(n;M)jM=1 = A
2R(1 )
4(1+R)(1 +n)2 >
A2R(1 )(1 +n)2
(1+R)(2 2+n)2(1 +2n)2 =
LS(n;M)jM=2 :
A2R(1 )
4(1+R)(1 +n)2 >
A2R(1 )(1 +n)2
(1+R)(2 2+n)2(1 +2n)2 , (2  2 + n)(1   + 2n) > 2(1   +
n)(1   + n), (1  )n > 0 which is obvious.
This implies that the graph of LS(n;M) shifts downward as M increases for all M 2 N:
Therefore a point of intersection of LS(n;M) and abna 1 shifts left as M increases. Thus
the equilibrium variety n(M) decreases in M .
Using the FOC (26) the manufacturers prots (??) can be rewritten as:
U = nc0(n)
1   + Mn
1   + Mn  n   c(n):
By the envelope theorem we have
d
dM
U (M;n(M)) =
@
@M
U (M;n(M)) =   nc
0(n)(n)2
(1   + Mn  n)2 < 0
and thus Um (M1) > Um (M2) if 1 < M1 < M2.
Proof of Proposition 16. On the picture bellow the dotted and the bold line represent
the graphs of the left and the right side of (26) respectively. The intersection point is the
point of the symmetric equilibrium. An increase in R or A shifts the graph of the left side
upward and thus the equilibrium point shifts right while an increase in  or b shifts the graph
of the right side upward and thus the equilibrium point moves left. Therefore the equilibrium
variety of each rm n increases in R;A and decreases in ; b. As w = A(1 )2(1 )+(M 1)n
inversely depends on n and does not depends on ; b;R directly we have that w increases
in ; b and decreases in R:
Proof of Proposition 17. As we show before the internal equilibrium (with n > 1)
cannot satisfy the free-entry condition. Thus we need to show that for any   1 there
existM c > 1 such that (i) (23) satised at point fM c; n = 1g, (ii) it satises the free entry
condition, that is U

Mc;n=1 = 0 and (iii) fM c; n = 1g indeed solves the manufacturer 1s
maximization problem or, in other words, that n1 = 1 maximizes (25) given fM c; n = 1g.
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Figure 4: The dotted (bold) line is the graph of the left (right) side of (12).
First lets note that if n = 1 the manufacturers prot function (??),
U

M;n=1 =
A2R
1 +R
(1  )(1   + (M   1))
(2(1  ) + (M   1))2(1   + M)   b;
has the following properties: U

M=1;n=1  0, it monotonically decreases in M and it
goes to  b < 0 as M ! 1. Therefore there exists the unique M = M c such that
U

M=Mc;n=1 = 0:
Second, it is easy to see that if M = M c; n = 1; w = A(1 )2(1 )+(Mc 1) then the system
(23) is satised with @
U
@w = 0 and
@U
@n < 0.
Next, lets note that the manufacturers prot U1 (n1; n
)

n=1 described by (25) is
concave in n1 for any   1. Therefore it has unique extremum point which is the point
of maximum. Combining these facts we conclude that for any   1 under the free entry
condition there exists unique solution and it is the corner solution with n = 1.
Finally as U (M; 1) = 0 we have that M = N s by denition of N s.
Proof of Lemma 18. By the implicit function theorem dMdn =   d
U=dn
dU=dM
. Calculating
derivatives, using U (M;n) = 0 and rearranging terms we obtain that dMdn =
(M;n;;)
'(M;n;) ,
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where
(M;n; ; ) = 2(1  )(1  )3 + (1  )2(3(M   1)  (5M   3))n 
 2(1  )(M   1)(4M   1)n2   (1 + )3(M   1)2Mn3;
'(M;n; ) = 2n2 + 2n2(4(M   1)n  4) + 3n(2 + (M   1)n( 4 + (2M   1)n):
As '(M;n; ) > 0 we have that dMdn < 0, (M;n; ; ) < 0: As (1+)3(M 1)2Mn3 > 0
the last holds for any M > 1 and any n > 1 whenever
2(1  )(1  )3 + (1  )2(3(M   1)  (5M   3))n  2(1  )(M   1)(4M   1)n2 < 0,
2(1  )(1  )2   (1  )(5M   3)n  (M   1)n  2(4M   1)n+ 3(1  ) < 0,
2(1  )(1  )  (5M   3)n < 0,
2(1  )(1  )  2 < 0,
(1  )(1  )   < 0,
1     < 0;
which holds by Assumption.
Now, d(Mn)dn =
dM
dn n+M =   d
U=dn
dU=dM
n+M > 0, (M;n; ; )n+ '(M;n; )M > 0.
Rearranging terms we get
n+ 'M =
= 3 (M   1)M (+M(1  ))n4 + 2 (1  ) (M   1) (4 (1  )M + )n3+
+(1  )  (1  )2 (5M   3)n2 + 2 (1  ) (1  )3 > 0
for all M > 1; n > 1;  2 (0; 1);  2 (0; 1):
Proof of Lemma 20. n() is determined by the second equation of (37). Taking
logarithms of both the left and the right sides and applying the implicit function theorem
we obtain
dn
da
=   n

(1  ) +
n((1  )(1  ) + n)
(1  )2(1  )  (1 + )n log(n
) < 0;
as (1 )2(1  ) (1+) < 0 and (1  )(1 ) + > 0 for any ;  :  2 (0; 1);  2
(0; 1); +  > 1:
55
The rst equation in the (37) implies that Mn = n

1    1  and thus
d(Mn)
da
=
dn
da
1
1   +
n
(1  )2 =
=
n
(1  )2

1  1=+ (1  ) (1  )(1  ) + n

(1  )2(1  )  (1 + )n log(n
)

< 0
as (1   )2(1   )   (1 + ) < 0; (1   )(1   ) +  > 0 and 1   1= < 0 for any
;  :  2 (0; 1);  2 (0; 1); +  > 1:
Also from the rst equation of (37) we obtain that (M   1)n = n1    1    n and
therefore
d((M   1)n)
da
=
dn
da
(
1
1     1) +
n
(1  )2 =
=
n(1  )(1  ) + n
(1  )3(1  )  (1  2)n log(n
) < 0;
as (1  )3(1  )  (1  2) < 0 for any ;  :  2 (0; 1);  2 (0; 1); +  > 1:
Finally M = 11    1 n implies that dM

d =
1
(1 )2 +
1 
n2
dn
d : Plugging expression for
dn
d and rearranging terms we get that
dM
d
> 0,
(  1)(1  ) + n
 (  1)(1  ) + n >
(1  )2(1  ) log(n)
(1  )2(1  )  (1 + )n :
The last inequality holds as for any ;  :  2 (0; 1);  2 (0; 1);  +  > 1; n > 1 we have
that ( 1)(1 )+n

 ( 1)(1 )+n > 0 >
(1 )2(1 ) log(n)
(1 )2(1 ) (1+)n : Therefore
dM
d > 0.
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CHAPTER III
STRATEGIC VERTICAL SEPARATION
3.1 Introduction
This paper examines rmschoice between vertical separation and vertical integration in
duopoly setting. Vertical separation is dened as selling through an independent exclusive
retailer and vertical integration as selling directly to nal consumers. The subject of the
possible advantages of vertical separation in strategic duopoly games has been receiving
growing attention in the recent economic literature on rms behavior. Bonanno and Vickers
(1988) consider a duopoly model with linear costs in which each manufacturer makes a
decision of whether to separate or integrate. Assuming price competition among retailers,
they show that vertical separation is both in the collective and in the individual interest of
rms. Thus, in the unique equilibrium both rms sell their products through independent
retailers.
Fershtman and Judd (1987) consider vertical separation under Cournot competition
with linear demand and constant marginal costs. They show that both manufacturers have
an incentive to separate and that the resulting equilibrium generates greater output, lower
prices and more e¢ cient allocation of production than the Cournot equilibrium. If rms
cost functions are symmetric, both rms receive lower prots compared to the ones in the
Cournot equilibrium. Under asymmetry of costs, the more e¢ cient rms prot may be
higher than in the Cournot equilibrium. The authors also show that in the case of Bertrand
competition with di¤erentiated products both manufacturers separate also and in a unique
equilibrium prots are higher and outputs are lower compared to Bertrand equilibrium.
Sklivas (1987) studies a delegation problem in which owners set objective functions for
their managers at the rst stage and then managers make a decision. His ndings are close
to those of Fershtman and Judd (1987): owners always take advantage of separation; in the
case of competition in quantity (prices) both rms earn lower (higher) prots.
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Lin (1988) considers a model in which the consumers have the discrete choice of buying
either one unit of good or not at all and retailers compete in prices. He shows that in
equilibria either both rms separate or both integrate.
Basu (1995) considers a model of managerial delegation in a duopoly with a linear
demand, constant marginal costs and competition in quantities. Assuming that separation
is associated with a xed cost, the author shows that asymmetric equilibria arise, even in
the case of symmetric rmscosts. In this model, in the absence of xed costs, if only one
rm separates, the prot of the separated (integrated) rm is higher (lower) compared to
the Cournot equilibrium. If both rms separate, each rms prot is strictly lower than
in the Cournot equilibrium. Basu, further, shows that there exists a level of the xed
cost such that, with only one rm separating, the nal prot of the separated rm is still
higher than its Cournot prot. Moreover, the prot of the integrated rm is higher than in
the case of both rms separating. Thus, if separation is associated with additional costs,
asymmetric equilibria arise and outputs levels are as in Stackelberg equilibrium. Similarly to
this, Jansen (2003) considers a Cournot oligopoly game with a linear demand and constant
marginal costs and assumes that separation implies a xed contracting cost. He shows that
asymmetric equilibria emerge, when the Cournot oligopolists supply close substitutes.
The following summarizes existing results. When goods are imperfect substitutes, un-
der Bertrand competition with constant marginal costs, it is both in the private and the
collective interest of rms to separate. In the case of Cournot competition with a linear
demand and constant marginal costs, it is in the private, but not in the collective, inter-
est of rms to separate. In the symmetric case rmsprots are strictly lower than in the
Cournot equilibrium. In the presence of a xed cost associated with separation, asymmetric
equilibria may arise.
In this paper we extend the existing literature by allowing for increasing marginal costs
and keeping all other assumptions of a standard separation game unchanged. We follow a
traditional approach in assuming that, in the case of vertical separation, a rm chooses both
a wholesale price, at which it will supply to its retailer, and a franchise fee. The retailer
chooses quantity to trade in order to maximize its own prot. In fact, separation implies
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that the rm delegates the decision on the quantity to its retailer and controls retailers
objective: using the franchise fee the rm extracts the entire retailers prot, with the
wholesale price being used to set the optimal incentive scheme o¤ered to the retailer. In the
case of integration the rm is a retailer of its own good and, as such, the rms objective is
maximization of own prot.
The main results of the paper are formulated for the quadratic cost functions. This
form of cost functions allows, rst, to capture e¤ects of decreasing economy of scale on a
structure of equilibrium and, second, still to have a solution in closed form.
I show that the optimal strategy, either to separate or to integrate, for each rm depends
on both its own and its rivals cost structure. More specically, the equilibrium market
structure critically depends on slopes of marginal cost functions, i.e., on the degree of
diseconomies of scale, and on asymmetry of rmscosts. If slopes of both marginal cost
functions are su¢ ciently low in unique equilibrium both rms separate. Under moderate
asymmetry of costs, in unique equilibrium, the more e¢ cient rm separates, whereas the
less e¢ cient one integrates. Asymmetric equilibria (with one rm separating and the other
integrating) arise in two cases: either if the slope of each manufacturers marginal cost is
su¢ ciently high or if asymmetry of costs is su¢ ciently high. When rms are symmetric,
equilibrium is determined by the degree of diseconomy of scale: if this degree is low, then
both rms separate, whereas if it is high, two asymmetric equilibria exist.
The intuition for these results is as follows. If only one rm separates, rms get the
same prots as in a Stackelberg game, with the separated rm being a Stackelberg leader.1
If two symmetric rms separate, each one has an incentive to set a low enough wholesale
price in order to increase its retailers output and prot. This results in a higher total
output and, actually, lower prots comparing to the Cournot outcome. A central question
is whether competition in wholesale prices between rms is such strong that rmsprots
fall bellow a Stackelberg follower prot. An answer depends on degree of diseconomy of
scale for the following reason. A decrease in, say, the rm 2s wholesale price results in
1Separation serves as a commitment mechanism in this case: the separated rm commits its retailers
high output by setting a low wholesale price.
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a decrease in the retailer 1s output, and hence in the rm 1s marginal cost.2 Both the
retailer 2s output and the total output increase, and thus a marginal revenue declines. The
rm 1s best reply is to restore a balance between its marginal cost and revenue. If the
slope of the rm 1s marginal cost function is high enough, the decline in its marginal cost
level is higher than that in marginal revenue, and the rm 1 should increase its output, that
is, decrease its wholesale price. Thus, rmswholesale prices are strategic complements.
In this case, competition in wholesale prices between rms may be so tough that it results
very low rmsprots, namely, lower than a Stackelberg follower prot. In such a situation,
each rm prefers to integrate (and to obtain the Stackelberg follower prot), given that its
rival separates. Therefore, asymmetric equilibria arise in a completely symmetric game.
Now, suppose that there is a cost asymmetry. Suppose also the rm 1 separates and
the rm 2 integrates and lets consider an incentive of the rm 2 to deviate. Separation of
the rm 2 has a twofold e¤ect: rstly, in the absence of the rm 1s reaction, the rm 2
could increase its prot by setting its wholesale price at an appropriate level. The possible
rm 2s gain depends on its own cost structure: the lesser e¢ cient the rm 2 is, the lesser
the gain obtained. Secondly, if the rm 1s wholesale price is a complement to the rm
2s wholesale price, the rm 1s reaction may imply a signicant decrease in its wholesale
price. This may lead to an increase in the total output, which decreases the rm 2s prot.
The latter e¤ect may dominate the former if the marginal curve of at least one rm is steep
enough. In this case each rm prefers to integrate, given its rival separates, implying the
existence of two asymmetric equilibria.
If a rms marginal curve is at, without its rivals marginal cost curve being very
steep, then it may be that the positive e¤ect of separation is always dominates the negative
e¤ect for the more e¢ cient rm but not for the less e¢ cient one. In this case, separation
is a dominant strategy for the more e¢ cient rm, while the less e¢ cient one prefers to
integrate. Then, there is a unique asymmetric equilibrium. Finally, if both marginal curves
are su¢ ciently at, the rst e¤ect dominates the second for both rms and in the unique
equilibrium both rms separate.
2This obviously cannot occur if the rmsmarginal costs are constant.
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Summing up, this paper provides a possible explanation for the widely observed asymme-
try in the sales strategies among rms3 based on the decreasing economy of scale. Moreover,
it predicts multiplicity of equilibrium when cost functions exhibits certain properties. In
particular, under some conditions any rm, either the less e¢ cient or the more e¢ cient,
may sell through its retailer while its rival sells directly to consumers.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model and provides
the characterization of equilibrium under general assumptions on the demand and cost
functions. Section 3.3 analyzes the case of quadratic cost functions and liner demand
functions as well as robustness of results. Finally, Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The general model and characterization of equilibrium
We consider an industry consisting of two rms. Each rm is denoted by i, with i = 1; 2.
Firms produce a homogeneous good with costs Ci(qi); i = 1; 2 and face the inverse demand
function given by P (Q), where Q = q1 + q2 with q1 and q2 denoting the quantity of the
rm 1 and the rm 2, respectively. The demand and cost functions satisfy the following
assumptions:
Assumption 3.1. 9Q > 0: P (Q) > 0 for Q 2 [0; Q) and P (Q) = 0 for Q  Q; P 00(Q)
is continuous; P (0) = P > 0,  P 0(Q) >  > 0, P 0(Q) + P 00(Q)qi < 0 for Q 2 [0; Q).
Assumption 3.2. Ci(q) is a twice continuously di¤erentiable increasing convex func-
tion, Ci(0) = 0, C 0i(0) = 0, 0 < C
00
i (Q) < b for all qi 2 (0; Q] and some b > 0.
Assumption 3.3. P (3)(Q)  0 for all Q 2 [0; Q):
Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 are su¢ cient conditions for existence of a unique equilibrium
in a Cournot game4 and together with Assumption 3.3 ensure existence of a pure strategy
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a whole game.
Firms play the following three-stage game. At the rst stage, each rm decides whether
it will sell its good through an independent exclusive retailer or it will sell it directly to
the nal consumers. Following Bonanno and Vickers (1988), we refer to the former case as
3See Buehler and Schmutzler (2005) and Jansen (2003) for a detailed discussion of the empirical obser-
vations over the asymmetry in vertical structures.
4See Van Long and Soubeyranb (2000) for details.
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vertical separation and to the latter case as vertical integration. In other words, at the rst
stage each rm chooses the action mi 2 fS; Ig; i = 1; 2, where S and I denoting respectively
vertical separation and vertical integration. If at the rst stage the rm i chooses mi = I;
it becomes the retailer of its own good.
At the second stage, the results of the rst stage are observed and each separated rm
sets the terms of a two-part tari¤ contact to trade with its retailer. More specically, it sets
a wholesale price wi and a franchise fee Ai.
At the third stage, all previous decisions are observed5 and retailers compete choosing
their quantities simultaneously and independently.
The prot of the integrated rm i is P (q1 + q2)qi   Ci(qi). If the rm i separates, its
own and its retailers prots are wiqi+Ai Ci(qi) and P (q1+q2)qi wiqi Ai, respectively.
3.2.1 Subgame outcomes
There are four subgames depending on the choice of mi 2 fI; Sg i = 1; 2 at the rst stage:
[I; I]; [S; S]; [S; I]; [I; S]. Next, I will analyze each of them.
If both rms vertically integrate, i.e., in the [I; I]-subgame, the rm is maximization
problem is:
max
qi
i = P (q1 + q2)qi   Ci(qi); i = 1; 2: (44)
Given Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, the game (44) has a unique Nash-Cournot equilibrium.
This equilibrium is characterized by the following rst order conditions:
P 0qi + P   C 0i = 0; i = 1; 2: (45)
Lets denote by fqC1 ; qC2 g and fC1 ; C1 g equilibrium quantities and prots in this sub-
game, respectively.
If both rms separate, i.e., in the [S; S]-subgame, retailers maximization problems are
max
qi
Ri = Pqi   wiqi  Ai; i = 1; 2;
5 It is assumed that all decisions are irreversible and therefore there is no commitment problem.
62
where w1; w2 are set by rms at the previous stage. Without loss of generality we assume
that wi  P . Then a solution of the retailersproblem is determined by the system of rst
order conditions:8><>: P
0q1 + P   w1 = 0
P 0q2 + P   w2 = 0
: (46)
The Jacobian matrix of (46) is
J =
0B@ P 00q1 + 2P 0 P 00q1 + P 0
P 00q2 + P 0 P 00q2 + 2P 0
1CA
with det (J) > 0 for any (q1; q2) and by the implicit function theorem we have that
dq
dw
=
1
det (J)
0B@ P 00q2 + 2P 0   (P 00q1 + P 0)
  (P 00q2 + P 0) P 00q1 + 2P 0
1CA ; (47)
where q  (q1; q2) and w  (w1; w2).
Let fqS1 (w1; w2); qS2 (w1; w2)g denote the solution of (46). Then, optimal values of w1; w2
satisfy:
@Si
@wi
= P 0
 
@qSi
@wi
+
@qSj
@wi
!
qSi + P
@qSi
@wi
  C 0i
@qSi
@wi
= 0; i 6= j: (48)
Directly di¤erentiating (48) in respect to wi and using (47) one can obtain that @2i=@w2i <
0 under Assumptions 1 and 2 and provided P (3)(Q)  0. Therefore Assumptions 3.1-3.3
ensure existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in the [S; S]-subgame. It is convenient to
rewrite (48) in the form
P 0qSi + P   C 0i + P 0qSi
 
@qSj
@wi
=
@qSi
@wi
!
= 0 (49)
where
@qSj
@wi
=
@qSi
@wi
=   P
00qSj + P
0
P 00qSj + 2P 0
: (50)
Let fqS1 ; qS2 g and fS1 ; S1 g be the equilibrium values in the [S; S]-subgame.
Plugging P 0qSi + P = wi into (49) and rearranging terms we obtain that
wi = C
0
i   P 0qSi
@qSj
@wi
=
@qSi
@wi
: (51)
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Under Assumptions 3.1-3.3, qSi (w1; w2) and q
S
j (w1; w2) satisfy
@qSi
@wi
< 0 <
@qSj
@wi
<
@qSi@wi  and
therefore wi < C 0i. In other words, if both rms separate, in equilibrium each rm sets its
wholesale price lower than its marginal cost.
If the rm 1 separates and the rm 2 integrates then the retailersgame8><>:
max
q1
R1 = Pq1   w1q1
max
q2
R2 = Pq2   C2
has rst order conditions8><>: P
0q1 + P   w1 = 0
P 0q2 + P   C 02 = 0
:
Lets note, that the retailer 2 has the Cournot reaction curve while a position of the retailer
1s reaction curve depends on the rm 1s choice of w1. Thus, by choosing w1, the rm 1
determines a point of intersection of reaction curves. Clearly, the optimal w1 is such that an
equilibrium outcome replicates the Stackelberg outcome of the [I; I]-subgame. Therefore,
the solution of the [S; I]-subgame may be also characterized as the following: qF2 (q1) solves
P 0q2 + P   C 02 = 0
and qL1 is such that
P 0q1 + P   C 01 + P 0q1
dqF2 (q1)
dq1
= 0: (52)
By the implicit function theorem we have that
dqF2
dq1
=   P
00qF2 + P 0
P 00qF2 + 2P 0   C 002
:
Let fqL1 ; qF2 g and fL1 ; F2 g denote equilibrium quantities and prots, respectively, with
the upper index F (L) referring to the separated (integrated) rm.6 The same arguments
apply to [I; S]-subgame, so let fqF1 ; qL2 g and fF1 ; L2 g be equilibrium values in the [I; S]-
subgame.
6The upper index F (L) indicates that the integrated (separated) rm obtains the Stackelberg followers
(leaders) prot.
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3.2.2 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
The previous results may be summarized in the following table:
Firm 2
Separate Integrate
Separate S1 ; S2 L1 ; F2
Firm 1
Integrate F1 ; L2 C1 ; C2
As it was argued above, if one rm separates and another integrates, then the equilibrium
outcome coincide with the Stackelberg equilibrium with the separated rm being a leader.
As it always hold that Li > 
C
i ; i = 1; 2, we have the following result.
Proposition 21 Under Assumptions 1-3 the [I; I]-subgame is never played in equilibrium.
Equilibrium is determined by the relation of rmprots Li ; 
F
i and 
S
i . More specif-
ically, [S; I] is equilibrium if F2  S2 ; [I; S] if F1  S1 ; [S; S] if F1  S1 ; F2  S2 .
Lets note that if Fi > 
S
i ; i = 1; 2, there are two asymmetric strict equilibria [S, I] and
[I, S]; whereas if Fi > 
S
i and 
F
j < 
S
j there is a unique asymmetric strict equilibrium,
in which the rm i integrates and the rm j separates. In order to compare rms prots,
and thus, fully determine equilibrium structure, we resort to the use of specic functions.
3.3 Linear demand and quadratic costs
In this Section, we consider linear demand function, P (Q) = 1   Q; and quadratic cost
functions, Ci(qi) = 12diq
2
i , with di  0; in order to characterize fully the equilibrium.
If both rms vertically integrate, they play a standard Cournot game:
max
qi
i = (1  qi   qj)qi   1
2
diq
2
i ; i; j = 1; 2:
Substituting the specic functions into (45) we obtain equilibrium quantities and prots
qCi =
1 + dj
(3 + 2di + djdi + 2dj)
and Ci =
(2 + di)(1 + dj)
2
2(3 + 2dj + djdi + 2di)2
; i; j = 1; 2:
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If both rms vertically separate, then rst order conditions of the retailersproblem (46)
is:
qi =
1  2wsi + wsj
3
; i; j = 1; 2;
with the total output and the nal price, respectively:
Q =
2  ws1   ws2
3
and P =
1 + ws1 + w
s
2
3
:
Then, the rm is maximization problem is given by:
max
wi
i =
1 + wsi + w
s
j
3
1  2wsi + wsj
3
  di
2

1  2wsi + wsj
3
2
;
and rst order conditions (48) determine rmsreaction curves in the space fws1; ws2g :
wsi =
( 1 + 2di)(1 + wsj )
4(1 + di)
; i; j = 1; 2: (53)
Lets note that dw
s
i
dwsj
= ( 1+2di)4(1+di) is strictly increasing in di with
dwsi
dwsj

di=0
=  14 ;
dwsi
dwsj

di=1=2
=
0;
dwsi
dwsj
!
di!+1
1
2 . Hence, the degree of substitution between w
s
i and w
s
j decreases in di:
Moreover, if di > 12 and di <
1
2 ; then
dwsi
dwsj
> 0 and
dwsj
dwsi
< 0. That is, wsi is a strategic
complement to wsj whereas w
s
j is a strategic substitute for w
s
i .
The system (53) has a solution:
wsi =
2di   2dj + 4didj   1
5 + 6di + 6dj + 4didj
:
Thus, the equilibrium quantities and prots are given by:
qSi =
2 + 4dj
(5 + 6di + 4didj + 6dj)
;
Si =
2(1 + di)(1 + 2dj)
2
(5 + 6di + 4didj + 6dj)2
;
i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j:
If the rm i separates and the rm j integrates, the retailersprot maximization prob-
lems: 8><>:
max
qi
Li = (1  qLi   qFj )qLi   wLi qLi
max
qj
Fj = (1  qFj   qLi )qFj   12dj

qFj
2 ;
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have a solution:8><>: q
L
i =
1+dj wLi (2+dj)
3+2dj
qFj =
1+wLi
3+2dj
: (54)
Plugging (54) into Li = (1  qLi   qFj )qi  12di
 
qLi
2
and optimizing with respect to wLi , we
obtain:
wLi =
(1 + dj)(2di + didj   1)
(2 + dj)(2 + 2dj + didj + 2di)
:
The respective equilibrium quantities and prots are given by:8><>: q
L
i =
1+dj
(2+2dj+didj+2di)
qFj =
1+dj+2di+didj
(2+dj)(2+2dj+didj+2di)
;
8><>: 
L
i =
(1+dj)
2
2(2+dj)(2+2dj+didj+2di)
Fj =
(1+dj+2di+didj)
2
2(2+dj)(2+2dj+didj+2di)2
:
It is easy to see that Li > 
C
i > 
F
i and, as it is prescribed by Proposition 1, the outcome
of the subgame [I; I] is never played in SPNE. To determine equilibrium we compare Fi
and Si . Lets consider the set (d1; d2) such that the rm i is indi¤erent between separating
and integrating given that the rm j separates:
Fi =
(1 + di + 2dj + didj)
2
2(2 + di)(2 + 2dj + didj + 2di)2
=
2(1 + di)(1 + 2dj)
2
(5 + 6di + 4didj + 6dj)2
= Si : (55)
It can be shown that di = i(dj); i; j = 1; 2 determined by (55) are such that: (i) di =
i(dj); i; j = 1; 2 are strictly concave and have a unique maximum; (ii) i(0) > 0 and (iii)
9dj < +1 : i(dj) = 0: Figure 5 gives a graphical representation of i(dj) and j(di).
In zone A (low d1 and low d2) both rms have relatively at marginal cost curves. In this
case each rm prefers to separate even if its rival separates and hence the unique equilibrium
is [S; S]. The equilibrium prot of each rm is lower than in the Cournot equilibrium, yet
higher than the Stackelberg followers prot: Fi < 
S
i < 
C
i . Although within zone A rms
may di¤er in e¢ ciency, this di¤erence is su¢ ciently small. In zone C (low d1 and moderate
d2), the rm 1 is more e¢ cient than the rm 2, with the di¤erence in e¢ ciency being not
too high. Then, strategy m1 = S is dominant for the the rm 1, while the rm 2 chooses to
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Figure 5: F2 > 
S
2 above the dashed line, 
F
1 > 
S
1 right at the dotted line.
integrate if the rm 1 separates, F1 < 
S
1 and 
F
2 > 
S
2 . Thus, the [S; I]-subgame is played
in SPNE. In zone D (low d1 and moderate d2), the situation is the opposite of that in zone
C and the [I; S]-subgame is played in SPNE. Finally, zone B is such that (either d1 or d2
or both are su¢ ciently high), each rm chooses to integrate provided its rival separates.
Therefore, two asymmetric equilibria, [I; S] and [S; I], exist.
Next Proposition summarizes the above results:
Proposition 22 (i) [S; S] is an equilibrium if (d1; d2) 2 A = f(d1; d2)j d1  1(d2); d2 
2(d1)g;
(ii) both [S; I] and [I; S] are equilibria if (d1; d2) 2 B = f(d1; d2)j d1  1(d2); d2 
2(d1)g;
(iii) [S; I] is an equilibrium if (d1; d2) 2 C = f(d1; d2)j d1  1(d2); d2  2(d1)g;
(iv) [I; S] is an equilibrium, if (d1; d2) 2 D = f(d1; d2)j d1  1(d2); d2  2(d1)g.
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Intuition for this result is the following. If the rm 1 separates and the rm 2 inte-
grates, then they get Stackelberg leader and follower prots, respectively. Lets consider
ew1 and ew2 which replicates this Stackelberg outcome in the [S; S]-subgame, that is such
that qS1 ( ew1; ew2) = qL1 and qS2 ( ew1; ew2) = qF2 . Now, a deviation of the rm 2 from strategy
I to strategy S is equivalent to switching from the outcome determined by f ew1; ew2g to the
outcome determined by fws1 ; ws2 g in the [S; S]-subgame. It may be shown that ew2 > ws2
for any d1; d2 while either ew1 < ws1 or ew1 > ws1 depends on values of d1 and d2.
Lets consider e¤ects of changes in w1 and w2 on the rm 2 prot. Clearly, the decrease
in w2 raises the output of the rm 2 and lowers one of the rm 1. If ew1 < ws1 then an
increase in w1 has the same qualitative e¤ect on outputs: q1 decreases and q2 increases. As
both changes raise the rm 2s prot, the rm 2 strictly prefers to deviate to separation.
This holds on the subset of zone A with d1 and d2 close enough to zero.
In contrast, if ew1 > ws1 then a decrease in w1 rises the rm 1s output and decreases
the rm 2s output. This has a negative impact on the rm 2s prot. In this case, the total
e¤ect of changes in both w1 and w2 depends on values of d1 and d2. If both d1 and d2 are
su¢ ciently low (the rest of zone A and zone D) then the positive e¤ect of the change in w2
dominates the negative e¤ect of the change in w1 and the deviation is protable. Otherwise,
the rm 2 prefers to integrate given the rm 1 separates (zones C and B).
The symmetric arguments apply for the case when the rm 1 chooses between separation
and integration given the rm 2 separates. Therefore, the zone A is the set fd1; d2g such
that each rm strictly prefers to separate and thus [S; S] is unique equilibrium. In the zone
C separation is a dominant strategy for the rm 1 while the rm 2s prot is higher if it
integrates given the rm 1 separates. Thus, there exists a unique asymmetric equilibrium.
Similarly, in the zone D; there exists a unique asymmetric equilibrium where the rm 2
separates and the rm 1 integrates. Finally, each rm prefers to integrate given that its
rival separates in the zone B and there exist two asymmetric equilibria.
Corollary 23 In the symmetric game with d1 = d2 = d, there exists a unique bd such that,
if d < bd; then [S; S] is the unique equilibrium while if d > bd, then there are two asymmetric
equilibria [I; S] and [S; I].
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In particular, bd  0:47 < 12 and dwidwj d1=d2=bd = dwidwj

d1=d2=bd   0:01 < 0: Thus, asym-
metric equilibria in the symmetric game arise even if rmswholesale prices are not strategic
complements; it is enough that the degree of substitution between them is su¢ ciently low.
3.3.1 Welfare analysis
Using explicit solutions for outputs in every subgame we have that for any xed d1; d2 the
following relation holds
qC1 + q
C
2 < q
L
1 + q
F
2 < q
S
1 + q
S
2 ;
that is, consumer surplus is maximized when both rms separate. Thus, if (d1; d2) 2 A
then rms actionsfSeparate; Separateg is optimal from the point of view of the consumer
surplus maximization. In respect to prots, we have reverse relationship
C1 + 
C
2 > 
L
1 + 
F
2 > 
S
1 + 
S
2 :
This implies that the total industry prot maximized in the Cournot setting. Calculating
the total welfare as the sum of consumers surplus and rmsprots for each subgame we
obtain that the total welfare in the [S; S]-subgame (TWSS) is always greater than the ones
in [S; I]-subgame (TWSI) and [C;C]-subgame (TWCC):
TWSS(d1; d2) > TW
SI(d1; d2);TW
SS(d1; d2) > TW
CC(d1; d2) for any d1; d2  0.
Thus, if (d1; d2) 2 A then rms choice of separation at the rst stage maximizes also the
total welfare.
3.3.2 Robustness
In this section, we come back to a general formulation of the model to provide arguments
on a robustness of main results7. Suppose P (Q); C1(q1) satisfy Assumptions 3.1-3.3. Lets
consider the the rm 2s cost function in the following form: C2(q2) = c2(q2); where  > 0
and c2(q2) satises Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2. Clearly, for any xed , C2(q2; ) satises
these Assumptions also.
7This section is based on a recent paper of Sloev (2010), to which we refer for more technical details.
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Lets consider the [S; I]-subgame. By (52) equilibrium of the subgame coincides with a
Stackelberg solution of the [I; I]-subgame and it is determined by the system8><>: P
0(Q)q1 + P (Q)  C 01 + P 0(Q)q1 dq
F
2 (q1)
dq1
= 0
P 0(Q)qF2 + P (Q)  c02(qF2 ) = 0
; (56)
with
dqF2
dq1
=   P
00(Q)qF2 + P 0(Q)
P 00(Q)qF2 + 2P 0(Q)  c002(qF2 )
:
Suppose that  ! 1. Then, both the rm 2s output and a change in qF2 in respect to
change in q1 go to zero, that is qF2 () ! 0, dq
F
2
dq1
! 0. Therefore, the second equation in
(56) uniformly converges to P 0(q1)q1 + P (q1)  C 01(q1) = 0; which implies that the rm 1s
output converges to a monopolistic one.
Now, lets consider the [S; S]-subgame. According to (49) the solution is determined by
the system8><>: P
0(Q)qS1 + P (Q)  C 01 + P 0(Q)qS1

@qS2
@w1
=
@qS1
@w1

= 0
P 0(Q)qS2 + P (Q)  c02 + P 0(Q)qS2

@qS1
@w2
=
@qS2
@w2

= 0
;
with
@qSj
@wi
=
@qSi
@wi
=   P
00(Q)qSj +P
0(Q)
P 00(Q)qSj +2P 0(Q)
: As  ! 1; the output of the rm 2 again goes to zero,
and
@qSj
@wi
=
@qSi
@wi
!  12 . Thus, the rst order condition for the rm 1 uniformly converges to
P 0(q1)q1=2 + P (q1) C 0i(q1) = 0; which implies that the rm 1s output is greater than the
monopolistic output.
Therefore, for  big enough, the output of the rm 1 in the [S; S]-subgame is greater than
it is in the [S; I]-subgame. As the Stackelberg follower prot decreases in the Stackelberg
leader output, we have that the rm 2s prot in the [S; S]-subgame is lower than it is in the
[S; I]-subgame. Thus, if the rm 1 separates, then the rm 2 prefers to integrate provided
its marginal cost curve is steep enough.
Now, lets consider the [I; S]-subgame. Again, as  ! 1, the rm 2s output goes to
zero and the rst order condition for the rm 1 uniformly converges to
P 0(qF1 )q
F
1 + P (q
F
1 )  C 01(qF2 ) = 0;
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which implies that the rm 1 output converges to the monopolistic output. As it was
shown above, the rm 1s output in the [S; S]- subgame exceeds the monopolistic output
and therefore the prot of the rm 1 in the [S; S]-subgame is lower than it is in the [I; S]-
subgame. Thus, the rm 1 prefers to integrate given that the rm 2 having very steep
marginal curves separates.
This analysis demonstrates that vertical separation and vertical integration coexist under
very mild assumptions on a demand and cost functions provided that diseconomy of scale
is high enough at least for one rm.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the rmsincentives to vertically separate (i.e., sell their
products through independent exclusive retailers), or vertically integrate (be retailers of
their own products) in a framework of Cournot model with a linear-demand and quadratic
cost functions.
We have demonstrated that the equilibrium market structure critically depends on rms
cost structures. Considering quadratic cost functions, we have shown that if rms cost
asymmetry is small and degrees of diseconomy of scale are su¢ ciently low for both rms,
in the unique equilibrium of the game both rms vertically separate. Under moderate
asymmetry in costs, when diseconomy of scale is low for the rst rm and it is high for
the second rm, there is a unique equilibrium in which the rst rm separates, whereas the
second integrates. If instead either the asymmetry in costs is extremely high or diseconomy
of scale is high for both rms then each rm prefers to integrate, given that its rival separates
and two asymmetric equilibria arise.
As a result, in the symmetric case in the unique equilibrium both rms separate if the
degree of diseconomy of scale is relatively low, and there are two asymmetric equilibria if
the degree of diseconomy is high. The intuition for these results is as follows.
If one rm separates and another integrates then a separated rm gets the Stackelberg
leader prot and the integrated rm gets the Stackelberg follower prot. Obviously, each
rm prefers to separate given that its rival integrates and therefore the case when both
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rms integrate is never equilibrium.
If two symmetric rms separate, their prots depend on strength of competition in the
wholesale prices among producers. The strength of this competition is in turn determined by
the degree of diseconomy of scale; higher diseconomy implies stronger competition. Strong
competition results in low wholesale prices, high output levels and prots lower than the
Stackelberg followers prot. Hence, if the degree of diseconomy is high, there are two
asymmetric equilibria in which one rm separates and the other integrates. If the competi-
tion in wholesale prices is weak (which is the case if diseconomy of scale is low), each rm
prefers to separate given that its rival separates. Hence, there exists the unique symmetric
equilibrium where both rms separate.
Our analysis provides a possible explanation for the widely observed asymmetry in rms
sales strategies based on decreasing economies of scales and cost asymmetry. It is worth to
note that in the model, separation neither implies a change in the production function nor is
associated with additional costs. In this sense, we have shown the existence of asymmetric
equilibria in a "pure" separation game.
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